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BeitragVerfasst am: Fr Nov 29, 2013 09:11:41 
Titel: dieser Backgroundkommentar
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erklärt sehr gut, was ideologisch so läuft in Teheran, was den "Deal" betrifft…



An Iranian Insider's View of the Geneva Deal

'If the right to enrich is accepted, which it has been, then everything that we have wanted has been realized.'


By SOHRAB AHMARI

Nov. 26, 2013 7:21 p.m. ET

The Obama administration and Western diplomats were elated by an agreement, negotiated over the weekend, to temporarily limit some aspects of Iran's nuclear-weapons program. The elation was shared by Tehran's negotiating team, led by Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, whose beaming smile and social-media savvy have been fixtures of the talks in Geneva. When the deal was sealed early on Sunday, Mr. Zarif took to Twitter TWTR +1.79% to announce: "We have reached an agreement."

But there is another Iran, where government officials are generally unsmiling and Twitter is banned. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps rule this land, not Mr. Zarif or his nominal boss, President Hasan Rouhani. It is in this Islamic Republic where the results of President Obama's nuclear diplomacy will be tested.

No Iranian news outlet more closely reflects the views of the supreme leader and the country's hard-line establishment than the Kayhan newspaper. The editor of Kayhan— Hossein Shariatmadari currently holds the post—is directly appointed by Mr. Khamenei and is considered the leader's representative to Iranian media.

On Sunday, I spoke on the phone with Payam Fazlinejad, a Kayhan writer and senior researcher and lieutenant of Mr. Shariatmadari's. The 32-year-old Mr. Fazlinejad is also a lecturer who addresses Islamic Republic elites on the ideological threats facing the regime—themes he has expounded on in such books as "Knights of the Cultural NATO" and "The Intellectuals' Secret Army." While he emphasized on the phone that his opinions don't necessarily represent those of his employer, Mr. Fazlinejad's views are typical of those held by a large and powerful element of the Tehran regime.


Mr. Fazlinejad's reading of the Geneva agreement mixes triumphalism and hard-nosed skepticism. "We need to be able to have an accurate view of what occurred and then assess it against the positions of the supreme leader and his guidance," he says. "But as a general matter, if the right to enrich is accepted, which it has been, then everything that we have wanted has been realized."

Last year, Mr. Shariatmadari, the editor of the newspaper, wrote that Iran has a right to enrich uranium up to 99%. The Obama administration insists that the Geneva agreement doesn't enshrine a right to enrich uranium. Yet the deal permits the Iranian regime to continue enriching uranium up to 5%—a level that can be quickly escalated to produce weapons-grade material. Mr. Fazlinejad views the Geneva 5% concession as great-power acquiescence to Tehran's enrichment program. "Now, the details—including the amount of enrichment and the specific enrichment locations and the technological shape of our enrichment program—are up to our technicians to determine," he says.

Given that the Geneva deal is an interim, six-month arrangement, with a final agreement still to come, Mr. Fazlinejad suggests that Western leaders must "take into account that the supreme leader's support for the negotiations and agreement has been conditional and by no means absolute. The leader instructed us that if the rights of the Iranian nation and the principles of the revolution are respected and the negotiating team stands up to the overbearing demands of the United States and the global arrogance"—the regime's terms for the West generally—"then he would support their work." On the other hand, if the agreement denies Iran's absolute right to enrich, "then it is from our view essentially void."

The Kayhan writer warns against perceiving any diplomatic agreement over Iran's nuclear program as a first step toward broader rapprochement between Washington and Tehran. "The nature of the opposition of the Islamic revolution with the regime of liberal democracy is fundamentally philosophical," Mr. Fazlinejad says. "It's an ideological difference. It is not a tactical enmity, or one that has to do with temporary interests, which can be shifted and the enmity thus done away with. . . . So in contrast to all the punditry of late in the international media, which says that these negotiations are a step toward peace between Iran and the United States—those who take this view are completely mistaken."

Western leaders, Mr. Fazlinejad says, are also misreading the meaning of Mr. Rouhani's election in June and his foreign policy. Pointing to the Iranian president's recent visits with the families of Iran's "martyrs," Mr. Fazlinejad says: "Notice how hard Mr. Rouhani's government works to show itself to be loyal to the revolution's ideological principles." The new president "won't make the mistake of thinking he can either distance the Islamic Republic's leadership from its ideological principles or seek its ideological collapse."

To drive home his point about the endgame of the negotiations over Iran's nuclear program, Mr. Fazlinejad offers an analogy from the Islamic Republic's early history, citing the late Ayatollah Khomeini's statement regarding the 1987 United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, which paved the way for a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War.

"In that message," Mr. Fazlinejad says, "the imam made it clear that our military war against the arrogance in the form of Iraq's regime is over. . . . But he advised the youth and the political activists to 'safeguard the revolutionary hatred and grievance in your hearts, look upon your enemies with fury and know that you will be victorious.' "

Khomeini's statement, Mr. Fazlinejad says, "was a message of peace, signaling a permanent cease-fire. But at the same time it asserted the vitality of our struggle against the capitalist order. If anyone gets the sense from these negotiations, as [Foreign Minister] Mr. Zarif has, that we are getting closer to the West, he is as mistaken as Mr. Zarif."

Mr. Ahmari is an assistant books editor at the Journal.
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BeitragVerfasst am: Do Dez 12, 2013 11:03:54 
Titel: Auch nix Neues
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was hier berichtet wird…

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/atomstreit-wie-iran-die-sanktionen-des-westens-umgeht-a-937697.html
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BeitragVerfasst am: Do Dez 12, 2013 17:27:19 
Titel: ja, so kann man das sehen...
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konzediere, ich gehöre auch dieser Denkschule an…

Zitat:


Strike Iran Now to Avert Disaster Later

A conventional-weapons attack is preferable to the nuclear war sure to come.

By NORMAN PODHORETZ

Dec. 11, 2013 7:12 p.m. ET

Not too many years ago, hardly anyone disagreed with John McCain when he first said that "the only thing worse than bombing Iran is letting Iran get the bomb." Today hardly anyone disagrees with those who say that the only thing worse than letting Iran get the bomb is bombing Iran. And in this reversal hangs a tale.

The old consensus was shaped by three considerations, all of which seemed indisputable at the time.

The first was that Iran was lying when it denied that its nuclear facilities were working to build a bomb. After all, with its vast reserves of oil and gas, the country had no need for nuclear energy. Even according to the liberal Federation of American Scientists a decade ago, the work being done at the Iranian nuclear facilities was easily "applicable to a nuclear weapons development program." Surprisingly, a similar judgment was made by Mohamed ElBaradei, the very dovish director of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The second consideration was that the prospect of being annihilated in a retaliatory nuclear strike, which had successfully deterred the Soviets and the Chinese from unleashing their own nuclear weapons during the Cold War, would be ineffective against an Iran ruled by fanatical Shiite mullahs. As Bernard Lewis, the leading contemporary authority on Islam, put it in 2007, to these fanatics "mutual assured destruction is not a deterrent, it is an inducement. We know already [from the Iran-Iraq war] that they do not give a damn about killing their own people in great numbers. . . . They are giving them a quick free pass to heaven and all its delights."

Nor were the rulers of Iran deterred by the fear that their country would be destroyed in a nuclear war. In the words of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who brought the Islamist revolution to Iran in 1979: "We do not worship Iran, we worship Allah. . . . I say let this land [Iran] go up in smoke, provided Islam emerges triumphant in the rest of the world." (The quote appeared in a 1981 Iranian collection of the ayatollah's speeches. In later editions, that line and others were deleted as Iran tried to stir up nationalistic fervor amid the war with Iraq.)

And here, speaking in particular of a nuclear exchange with Israel—that "cancer" which the mullahs were and are solemnly pledged to wipe off the map—is the famous "moderate" Hashemi Rafsanjani, in an Al-Quds Day sermon at Tehran University on Dec. 14, 2001: "Application of an atomic bomb would not leave anything in Israel, but the same thing would just produce damages in the Muslim world." Mr. Rafsanjani, an earlier president of Iran, is the sponsor and mentor of its current president, that other celebrated "moderate," Hasan Rouhani.

The third consideration behind the old consensus was the conviction that even if the mullahs could be deterred, their acquisition of a nuclear capability would inevitably trigger a nuclear-arms race in the Middle East. Because the Sunni regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and elsewhere throughout the region were all terrified at the prospect of being lorded over and held hostage by an Iran ruled by their ancestral enemies the Shiites, those regimes would rush to equip themselves with their own nuclear arsenals.

Such an arms race would vastly increase the danger that these weapons might go off, if not by design then by accident. Retired Col. Ken Allard, a former dean of the National War College, explained why last week in the Washington Times: "Even with the steady injection of technology, U.S. and Soviet permissive-action links and fail-safe systems still needed a fair amount of luck to avoid an accidental detonation. What about Iranian, Saudi or even Egyptian nuclear forces? If they build such weapons, will they also invest in the technologies and practice the unforgiving disciplines needed to avoid the worst of all man-made calamities?"

Just as almost everyone agreed that Iran must be prevented from acquiring a nuclear capability, there was a similarly broad agreement that this could be done through a judicious combination of diplomacy and sanctions. To be sure, there were those—myself emphatically included—who argued that nothing short of military action could do the trick. But we were far outweighed by the proponents of peaceful means who, however, willingly acknowledged that the threat of military action was necessary to the success of their strategy.

Yet as the years wore on, it became clear, even to the believers in this strategy, that the Iranians would not be stopped either by increasingly harsh sanctions—or by endless negotiations. One might have expected the strategy's proponents to conclude, if with all due reluctance, that the only recourse left was to make good on the threat of military action. Yet while they continued to insist that "all options are on the table," it also became increasingly clear that for Western political leaders as well as the mainstream think tanks and the punditocracy, the stomach for the military option was no longer there, if indeed it had ever been.

And so began the process of what Col. Allard calls "learning to love the Iranian bomb." The first step was to raise serious doubts about the old consensus. Yes, the Iranians were determined to build a bomb, and, yes, the mullahs were Islamist fanatics, but on further reflection there was good reason to think that they were not really as suicidal as the likes of Bernard Lewis persuaded us. That being the case, there was also good reason to drop the idea that it would be impossible to deter and contain them, as we had done even with the far more powerful Soviets and Chinese.

It was the new consensus shaped by such thinking that prepared the way for the accord reached by six major powers with Iran in Geneva last month. The Obama administration tells us that the interim agreement puts Iran on a track that will lead to the abandonment of its quest for a nuclear arsenal. But the Iranians are jubilant because they know that the only abandonment going on is of our own effort to keep them from getting the bomb.

Adherents of the new consensus would have us believe that only two choices remain: a war to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or containment of a nuclear Iran—with containment the only responsible option. Yet as an unregenerate upholder of the old consensus, I remain convinced that containment is impossible, from which it follows that the two choices before us are not war vs. containment but a conventional war now or a nuclear war later.

Given how very unlikely it is that President Obama, despite his all-options-on-the-table protestations to the contrary, would ever take military action, the only hope rests with Israel. If, then, Israel fails to strike now, Iran will get the bomb. And when it does, the Israelis will be forced to decide whether to wait for a nuclear attack and then to retaliate out of the rubble, or to pre-empt with a nuclear strike of their own. But the Iranians will be faced with the same dilemma. Under these unprecedentedly hair-trigger circumstances, it will take no time before one of them tries to beat the other to the punch.

And so my counsel to proponents of the new consensus is to consider the unspeakable horrors that would then be visited not just on Israel and Iran but on the entire region and beyond. The destruction would be far worse than any imaginable consequences of an Israeli conventional strike today when there is still a chance to put at least a temporary halt, and conceivably even a permanent one, to the relentless Iranian quest for the bomb.

Mr. Podhoretz was the editor of Commentary from 1960-95. His most recent book is "Why Are Jews Liberals?" (Doubleday, 2009).


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BeitragVerfasst am: Do Dez 19, 2013 09:47:15 
Titel: Österreichbezug
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was die Sanktionen betrifft….

Österreich war immer und wird es wohl auch unter dieser Regierung sein, ein höchst unsicherer Kantonist, wenn es darum ging geopolitisch mit der Freien Welt solidarisch zu sein…

der Bericht hier…naja, wird schon so gewesen sein..

http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/1509218/IranOsterreich_Wollten-nie-Sanktionen-gegen-Iran?from=gl.home_politik
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BeitragVerfasst am: Do Dez 19, 2013 12:28:39 
Titel: Frankreich
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hegt wieder, respektive immer noch, grosse Zweifel an der Integrität des "Deals"..

Aussenminister Fabius in einem Interview im "Tschörnl"..

Zitat:


France Voices Doubt on Iran Nuclear Deal

Foreign Minister Fabius Concerned Tehran Won't Drop Ability to Build a Bomb

By STACY MEICHTRY and GERARD BAKER

Updated Dec. 18, 2013 7:27 p.m. ET


PARIS—France's foreign minister voiced doubts that Western powers will reach a final nuclear deal with Iran, questioning Tehran's willingness to abandon its ability to build an atomic bomb.

Laurent Fabius has propelled France to the forefront of nuclear talks by taking a tough stance on Iran, which insists its nuclear program is for civilian and scientific use only.

To reach a lasting agreement, Western powers are pressing Tehran to adopt measures that unwind its nuclear capabilities to the point that a weapon is no longer within reach.

That goal has been partly overshadowed by disagreements over how to implement a preliminary accord that temporarily freezes Iran's nuclear program in exchange for limited relief from biting sanctions.

"We have to implement honestly the first phase," Mr. Fabius said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal.

"Then my main concern is the second phase. It is unclear if the Iranians will accept to definitively abandon any capacity of getting a weapon or only agree to interrupt the nuclear program."

Mr. Fabius played a central role in toughening terms of the first deal with Iran.

His warning that world powers risked being drawn into a "fool's game" by Iran nearly derailed the talks in November.

Mr. Fabius said Western powers need to focus their efforts on how to deprive Iran of "breakout capacity," the ability to restart a bomb-making program from dormant nuclear sites and make a quick dash to a weapon before world powers can react.

"What is at stake is to ensure that there is no breakout capacity," Mr. Fabius said.

His remarks, at this pivotal stage in international negotiations, reflect the challenges in securing a final deal with Iran.

Some U.S. officials have also grown skeptical in the weeks since Secretary of State John Kerry helped strike the preliminary deal with Iran in Geneva.

President Barack Obama said recently that he didn't think the likelihood of a long term deal was "more than 50-50."

Nonetheless, U.S. officials have left little doubt they are eager to find a way to reach a final deal with Iran and international powers, saying that without one, Iran would lurch even closer to a break-out capability and bring the region nearer to war.

"Not even trying for a deal, I think, would be a dire mistake," Mr. Obama said Dec. 7 in Washington.

Tehran has long defended what it says is its right to enrich uranium and to build nuclear reactors. Western nations say those capabilities clear the way for Iran to produce fuel for an atomic bomb.

On Nov. 24, Iran reached the interim agreement with the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany, a diplomatic bloc known as the P5+1. The accord relaxes economic sanctions on Iran in return for freezing its nuclear activities.

Those measures were intended to build confidence between the parties while they pursue a final agreement.

Since then, however, Iran and Western powers have been at loggerheads over how to implement the accord.

Iran lashed out at the U.S. last week for adding companies and individuals to its sanctions blacklist, a move Washington said complied with the interim agreement.

Much of the impasse stems from disagreements over which side—Iran or the West—should take the first steps.

"One of the biggest questions of this accord is when and how it will be implemented," said Behzad Azarsa, an economic adviser at Iran's Embassy in France.

He said he expected these issues and other related matters to be cleared up in coming meetings.

Last week, Iran protested the additions to the U.S. blacklist by suspending talks aimed at resolving differences over how to implement the interim accord. Those negotiations are expected to resume on Thursday, according to the European Union.

Under the preliminary deal, the EU and U.S. agreed to ease some sanctions on Iran's petrochemicals sector and scrapped a ban on trade in precious metals. The U.S. agreed to unfreeze some $4.2 billion in Iranian oil revenue held abroad. The EU agreed to ease financial transfers to Iran for permitted trade.

Mr. Fabius said France and other EU countries won't begin to relax sanctions until the International Atomic Energy Agency has inspected Iranian nuclear sites to verify Tehran has suspended the program.

Under the accord, inspectors are authorized to make daily rounds at the facilities, but those checks have yet to begin, according to Western and Iranian officials.

"The inspections must technically start before we lift," said Mr. Fabius. The early scrutiny ensures Tehran upholds its end of the deal as sanctions are eased and the talks advance, Western officials said.

Mr. Fabius said he was working toward a final agreement that is tougher, tightening inspections and reining in Iran's stockpile of uranium and its ability to process new fuel.

France is a longtime skeptic of Tehran's nuclear program. A decade ago, France helped negotiate a deal with Iran to halt its nuclear program only to see Tehran back out of the agreement years later.

"What we have to do is act in such a way that cheating is in practice impossible," Mr. Fabius said.


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BeitragVerfasst am: Di Jan 07, 2014 09:00:31 
Titel: recht gute Zusammenfassung..
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der französischen Position…

Zitat:


France, Iran and the 'Front of Mistrust'

Tehran makes a sly offer on nuclear talks; Paris leads the opposition.


By JOHN VINOCUR
Jan. 6, 2014 3:09 p.m. ET
Paris

In the midst of the West's Christmas to New Year's snooze, Iran's ayatollahs demonstrated their share of big-time cunning. The result: remarks that look like an offer to the U.S. of one-on-one talks on Tehran's nuclear program, which would maximize its chances of getting a concession-laden deal from the Obama administration.

The offer (even though that's not how Iran described it) was made in a statement Dec. 27 by Ali Akbar Velayati, a former foreign minister who is often referred to as the closest adviser on external affairs to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Iranian Supreme Leader.

It appeals to the White House's desire to resuscitate Barack Obama's presidency with a slam-bam peace-in-my-time accord; may satisfy many previously resistant Congressmen with the sense they will have a greater hand in the final negotiations; and block an increasingly assertive naysayer's role for France among the U.N. Security Council's Iran negotiators.

All this, while the ayatollahs generously save face for the other five countries (Britain, China, Russia, France, and Germany) by offering them separate one-on-one talk-tracks (and, presumably, tailor-made trade opportunities). Artful, no?

According to an Associated Press dispatch headlined, "Iranian official calls for direct talks with Washington," Mr. Velayati said of the current Iran-Security Council discussions, "We aren't on the right path if we don't have one-on-one talks with the six countries. We have to have talks with the countries separately."

The exceptionally clever aspect of the maneuver is that it can gain a degree of theoretical traction in Washington, and something very close to support in capitals like London and Berlin, where the dominant idea is "get the Iran thing done." Which means Barack Obama, having already given ground on Iranian uranium enrichment, and remaining inexplicit about more concessions, would be effectively left with the West's share of decisions about the young century's most important international-security problem.

Camille Grand, director of the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research, gave Iranian cleverness its due over the weekend, saying, "The fact is, three-quarters of the world would applaud" America's taking over the show.

In this case, the Obama administration just might think that France, with its irritating vision of itself as the world's guardian of nuclear non-proliferation, could be dismissed as a strategic nag, increasingly alone, and no longer Washington's co-equal in dealing with Tehran.

Indeed over the past few months, a number of former French diplomats, backed by commercial interests, have been arguing to this effect: "The Americans will eventually go to one-on-one talks, and we'll be isolated because Obama wants a deal and the Iranians are smart enough to give him one."

Now, with French forces struggling to halt a jihadist takeover of the broken and lawless Central African Republic, more Paris voices are saying it's no time to be butting heads with the Americans on Iran when more U.S. military support is needed to keep France's African mission from becoming a shambles.

Surprise: The French government is not backing off from trying to block rotten concessions that would allow Iran to install itself as a de facto "threshold" country, with the ability to achieve nuclear-armed status in months. Alongside a miserable year-and-a-half start to François Hollande's presidency, his activist foreign and security policy is portrayed here as the hard rock of a French foundation of responsibility and determination.

A day after Mr. Velayati's one-on-one remarks, President Hollande spent two days in Riyadh with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. A French aide said the king spoke of the two countries' "converging" views on what to do about Iran and Syria, and described the French positions as "courageous" and "pioneering."

This characterization, for lack of greater Saudi precision, says the Saudis stand with France's insistence that the Iranians must definitively renounce atomic arms, and Bashar Assad must leave Syria in order to allow for a political solution to the country's monstrous civil war.

The link with Saudi Arabia in the midst of its very public disillusionment with the Obama administration has the appearance of putting France in the middle of an informal Front of Mistrust, knitting together the doubts of Israel, the Saudis and the U.S. Congress about America's intentions in the Middle East.

I asked a high-ranking national security official involved for his country in both the Iranian and Syrian issues about how he regarded the circumstances. He requested not to be further identified, but replied in full:

"The Saudis are in a huge sulk, and the French are doing a lot of posturing in this connection, telling them 'You can't rely on the United States, you can't rely on Britain.' But the Saudis know there is no way forward for them without a strong affiliation with the Americans. And the French are too clever to deny that. What's behind this is France pressing its long-term commercial interests in the country at a time when it sees the Saudis wanting to show the Obama Administration the extent of their disfavor."

Would a high-ranking French official care to swat at the accusation?

Here's what one said: "A non-credible agreement with Iran would be disastrous. The acceptance by the West of a bad compromise would make an Israeli attack on Iran a certainty. France sees its current role as the guarantor of credibility" for any deal claiming to eliminate the threat of Iran getting nuclear weapons or retaining the breakout capacity to produce them very quickly.

Slyly—and the French can well handle all comers, including Iran, in this department—the official added this observation: "You know, when friends in Europe or elsewhere carefully examine France's position they can find its strength to be the mirror image of their own weakness."


Mr. Vinocur is former executive editor of the International Herald Tribune.


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BeitragVerfasst am: Di Jan 21, 2014 14:40:45 
Titel: interessante Analyse
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zum Status jetzt…

Zitat:


How A Weak Iran Deal Makes Us All Less Safe and War More Likely


Emanuele Ottolenghi

9th January 2014 - The Tower

The debate over whether Israel would launch an attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities to blunt Tehran’s nuclear ambitions has always loomed large in the mind of Western policymakers. At times, it almost seemed as if what motivated Western sanctions and, occasionally, negotiators was more the fear of an Israeli strike than that of an Iranian nuclear arsenal. Now that the P5+1 states and Iran have signed a Joint Plan of Action in Geneva raising hopes for a comprehensive agreement over Iran’s nuclear program, is an Israeli attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities off the table?

There have always been those who believed that Israel was bluffing all along. They would customarily cite distance, operational challenges, timing, precedent, and potential regional responses to explain how Israel’s threat lacked substance. Whether they were right, something fundamental may have now changed that an interim agreement between Iran and the six world powers has been initialed. Some say it is a new day—Iran and the United States are talking to each other in unprecedented ways. There is light at the end of the long diplomatic tunnel, supporters of the Geneva agreement contend, and because of this Israel would be truly on its own if it launched a strike now.

Writing in The National Interest, journalist Zachary Keck recently offered five reasons why Israel will not pre-empt. Keck’s argument, which represents much of the conventional wisdom that portends against an attack, is compelling because each of his five points, as well as the overarching thesis, seems grounded in what appears to be a practical assessment of the situation. Though Keck argues against the attack based on a range of considerations, from feasibility to desirability, he maintains that such an attack has already become politically impossible. Keck quotes Jeffrey Goldberg, who wrote in Bloomberg View that Obama has “boxed-in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu so comprehensively that it’s unimaginable Israel will strike Iran in the foreseeable future.”

What Keck and many other like-minded commentators, politicians and diplomats working on the issue have failed to take into consideration is that the opposite scenario—that the Geneva talks have actually increased the likelihood of an attack by Israel—is just as plausible.

Keck’s first claim is that if Israel were going to attack, it would have done so already—and probably long ago. Looking to the precedents of Israel’s attacks on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, and Deir al-Zour, Syria, in 2007, Keck argues that Israel launches its strikes very early in the game. “It would be completely at odds with how Israel operates,” Keck writes, “for it to standby until the last minute when faced with what it views as an existential threat.”

While it sounds like a reasonable claim, Keck, like many who have argued the same point recently, depends on three flawed critical assumptions: First, that an attack on Iran’s facilities poses similar challenges to Osirak in Iraq and Deir al-Zour in Syria; Second, that, having missed the opportunity early in the game, it is now too late; and finally, that Israel’s threats are a giant and ongoing bluff.

The difficulty and complexity of launching a pre-emptive strike on Iran is not a trivial matter. The operational difficulty of the mission, the existence of alternatives, and the expectation that, if all else fails, the United States may do it, are all possible explanations for why Israel kicked the can down the road. But on the critical issue of timing, Israel still has room. The Arak heavy water reactor is not operational yet, and the other targets in Iran, unlike Osirak and Deir Al-Zour, are not reactors that must be struck before the nuclear core is hot to avoid a massive radioactive fallout.

The third assumption—that Israeli leaders who say “all options are on the table” must be lying—is the most perplexing. Keck appears to believe that because a strike is unlikely, Israeli leaders have been lying for years about their country’s readiness to launch a strike. And his strongest evidence is that high-profile former members of the security establishment have over time repeatedly criticized Israel’s prime minister about his public posture on Iran.

“What is clearer is that Netanyahu lacks the support of much of Israel’s highly respected national security establishment,” Keck writes. “Many former top intelligence and military officials have spoken out publicly against Netanyahu’s hardline Iran policy, with at least one of them questioning whether Iran is actually seeking a nuclear weapon.”
That Israel’s security establishment is having a robust public debate over this matter does not mean Israel will not do it. There are no doubt prominent critics of Israeli pre-emption at this stage, but today their disagreements are more operational than political. The debate is unprecedented in its public nature, and one could take it as evidence that the consensus needed in Israel’s security establishment to authorize a pre-emptive strike is lacking.

But to take these dissenting voices of former Israeli military and intelligence officials as evidence of anything requires applying a kind of exceptionalism to Israeli public life. Retired Mossad and Military Intelligence officials voicing views in public that they could not express while in service hold the same value as similar opinions, authored by former U.S. Secretaries of State or National Security Advisers, about where the Obama Administration’s foreign policy can or cannot go. Though they’re often well known, some with political stars in their eyes, or scores to settle, rarely are these voices considered evidence of policy.
Even if they were, one could cite some of their peers opining in the opposite direction. One such figure in the Israeli case is former Israel Military Intelligence Chief Amos Yadlin, who told The New Republic, a mere month before the interim deal was signed, that operationally, in late 2013, Israel could still pull a success.

But far more importantly, Israelis of all political persuasions are united in seeing a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat. Their disagreements are more about tactics than strategy. Even as we hear public criticism of Israel’s very public spat with the Obama administration over the interim deal, the discourse is more about how disagreements with Washington should be handled, and less about the substance of the agreement itself, which most Israelis in a position to influence the course of policy appear similarly to view as weakening pressure on Iran prematurely, and damaging for Israel’s vital interests.

Keck’s second point is that a strike would make an Iranian bomb likelier. “Israel’s attack would also give the Iranian regime a legitimate (in much of the world’s eyes) reason to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and kick out international inspectors,” he writes. “If Tehran’s membership didn’t even prevent it from being attacked, how could it justify staying in the regime? Finally, support for international sanctions will crumble in the aftermath of an Israeli attack, giving Iran more resources with which to rebuild its nuclear facilities.”

The problem with this argument is that there is a very good chance that the sanctions regime will collapse as a result of the interim agreement itself. With Iran already benefiting from a cash bonanza triggered by market expectations about agreed sanctions relief, one can see the sanctions regime crumbling well before the final contours of a nuclear deal become clear. Within weeks of the interim deal, Iran’s petrochemical sector alone had appreciated by $9 billion—almost a 40 percent capital gain, entirely generated by a new market psychology that bets on the end of sanctions.

Iran’s economy has already been rescued, and so are its procurement abilities. Had the agreement left all sanctions in place, Keck’s second point would have some validity. With sanctions on their way out, and diplomacy heavily invested in a deal, it is a harder sell. And with a final agreement likely to leave Iran’s nuclear weapons capability intact, Israel would be in a much worse position to attack then than it is now.

The same goes with the claim that Iran would abandon the NPT—after all, Iran has not exactly shown itself inclined to honor its obligations, using them as a shield and a pretext rather than a constraint. Similar to the sanctions easing, the interim deal has fatally undermined the NPT by watering down Iran’s compliance obligations, undercutting the IAEA’s authority in matters of verification, and ignoring the military dimensions of the program documented by the Agency, which are all at the heart of the dispute. In fact, if a final agreement were to emerge that fails to address the flaws present in the interim deal, including continued enrichment work, Iran would be able to break out under the cover of the NPT. There would be little to lose if the destruction of Iran’s nuclear capabilities had such side-effect.

The real question one should ask is whether Iran could reconstitute its bombed-out program after an attack, and how much faster this could happen if Iran left the NPT. The NPT safeguards have proven woefully insufficient to detect Iran’s clandestine activities and procurement efforts; on the other hand, an NPT walkout would constrain Iranian access to dual-use technology, raw materials and scientists. But it could give Israel a pretext to launch further strikes in the future. Besides—the audience most likely to indulge Iran in such a step, the Non-Aligned Movement, already views the NPT as a Western-imposed straightjacket in bad need of reform.

So it is possible that Iran would leave the NPT, but so is the opposite. A walkout would present significant challenges for Iran to reconstitute its program even without the bother of having inspectors swarming its facilities. And it may not grant Iran much to gain.

Would Western governments suddenly relax their export controls on nuclear technology? Or would an NPT walkout spur even greater efforts to interdict procurement? Would three decades of slow and stealthily acquired technological gains so easily be reconstituted overnight, now that Iran’s procurement activities would be under an even bigger magnifier? And this does not even begin to address another issue: Would a stricken regime rise, the morning after its most prized asset has been pulverized, as if nothing happened? Would there be no challenge to its authority within the system or from the people, after such a humiliating blow? Are we sure that an NPT walkout will play in Iran’s favor, or that it will matter at all?

Keck’s argument that an Israeli attack will make an Iranian bomb likelier becomes most problematic when it turn to the Iranian regime itself, and particularly his sweeping claim about Ali Khamenei’s supposed nuclear fatwa. “At home,” he writes, “Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could use the attack to justify rescinding his fatwa against possessing a nuclear-weapons program, while using the greater domestic support for the regime and the nuclear program to mobilize greater resources for the country’s nuclear efforts.”

Keck seems to believe that the fatwa is both binding and changeable. But binding religious norms are not changeable, and changeable fatwas are not very binding for the simple reason that religious leaders can change them. As Mehdi Khalaji of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy notes:
“Iranian nuclear decision-making… bears the significant imprint of one man’s personality and politics—an imprint that may be unaffected by the will of other men, the decisions of other institutions, or, most ironically, the legal scruples or moral dictates of his own religion.”

Khamenei could change his mind tomorrow. Besides, given what Iran has been doing over three decades with its clandestine nuclear activities, one should not be overconfident that the fatwa is not, in fact, a ruse.
Finally, Keck misreads the region and its dynamics. He assumes that a U.S.-Iran rapprochement would temper Iran’s worst instincts and keep Sunni monarchies too busy panicking with this realignment to bother with Israel. Conversely, he assumes that an attack on Iran would trigger pan-Arab opprobrium against Israel, in response to a public groundswell of support for Iran across the Arab world. This would mean that “the quiet but growing cooperation Israel is enjoying with Sunni Arab nations against Iran would evaporate overnight. Even though many of the political elites in these countries would secretly support Israel’s action, their explosive domestic situations would force them to distance themselves from Tel Aviv for an extended period of time.”

Further improvement of relations between Washington and Tehran could yield a number of results—and Keck describes one of them. But for Iran to cool its temper in the way he expects, a number of caveats are in order. First, there is nothing to suggest that Iran wishes to exchange its adversarial relation with the United States to a patron-client one. If anything, Iran sees a diminishing American influence as a sign that the Obama Administration will acquiesce to Iran’s hegemonic ambitions.
It is not just that Israel sees it that way, so do the Sunni monarchies. An Israeli-Saudi détente finds common cause in that reading, but it depends on whether Israel’s willingness to strike the common foe is there. The other Gulf monarchies are already initiating unprecedented diplomacy with Iran as a way to hedge their bets having watched American policy unfold in Syria, shifting military deployments in the Gulf and diplomatic concessions on Iran’s nuclear program. Why would they rush to embrace Israel under these circumstances unless they thought Israel would relieve them of their Iran discomfort?

An attack, rather than a refrain from doing so, would likely improve Israel’s relations with Sunni regional powers, especially if it comes before any Iranian-American deal, however unlikely, takes hold. No doubt, none of them will give Israel diplomatic cover at the UN once condemnations start to pour in. There are limits to what this convergence of interests can deliver. But all Israel needs is a certain level of operational acquiescence. Such complicity will increase the chances of success.

Keck believes that the consequences will be disastrous because, among other things, Iran may try to draw the U.S. into the conflict. Yet, that is exactly the type of development that would sway things Israel’s way. The United States would respond forcefully to an attack—and it may end up destroying what Israel cannot reach with its limited military capability. After that, any chance of an Iran-U.S. rapprochement of the type Keck describes would be truly unlikely. It is just as possible, therefore, that Iran’s response would be significantly more circumspect, limited to unleashing Hezbollah, launching terrorism against Israeli and Jewish soft targets overseas, and playing victim to the world audience. It will not be Israeli public diplomacy’s finest hour, but if it comes to a preventative strike, Israel will probably conclude it can live with more bad publicity.
That includes in the Arab world, where sympathy for Iran is not exactly running high. Keck appears to underestimate the irreparable damage Iran and its franchise, Hezbollah, have done to their own image among Sunni audiences in the 30-month-long intimate involvement in the mass slaughter and ethnic cleansing of Sunnis in Syria. It is entirely possible that the legion of jihadi enthusiasts who rushed to Syria to fight the Assad regime and, by extension, Iran and Hezbollah, will not look too happy with the telltale signs of an Israeli-Saudi collusion against Iran’s nuclear program. But their hatred for the Shi’a Persian foe is deeper, and an Israeli attack will only solicit the usual perfunctory street protests and tame condemnations from officialdom in the region. It’s a small price to pay for access to Saudi airspace and maybe more.

Keck also omits one more critical factor that looms large in Israel’s calculations. Parallel to Iran’s diplomatic efforts to relieve international pressure on its own program, for some years now there have been concerted efforts, especially in the framework of the NPT Review conferences, to shift the focus of international attention on Israel’s nuclear program—efforts which unsurprisingly have found strong favor among Non-Aligned Movement countries and enthusiasm among Arab states, including those who see Iran’s nuclear ambitions as a threat.
If Israel did nothing now, it might later confront an environment where Iran remains a nuclear threshold state under diminishing sanctions, enjoying international legitimacy and a détente with the United States. Meanwhile, Israel would find itself under pressure to reveal the full extent of its nuclear program. And make no mistake, Sunni Arab countries will not give Israel any discount on this matter.

Keck may be right that Israel would be deterred from attacking in the immediate aftermath of the interim deal. But much less so for the long haul. If anything, once the dust has settled, it should become evident that an Israeli pre-emptive attack on Iran is now more, not less likely to occur, as a result of the changing environment created especially, though not exclusively, by the weak interim deal.

It is hard to believe that the last five prime ministers of Israel and the different political establishments they represent were all bluffing. Even if they were, before the interim deal was signed in Geneva, one regional actor took Israel’s public warnings seriously—and that was the Islamic Republic of Iran, which sought to deter an Israeli attack by assembling the best anti-aircraft technology it could buy and, failing that, took Israel seriously enough not to provoke a strike.

The most obvious example of this behavior was after Netanyahu’s “bomb speech” at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2012, when the Israeli prime minister told the world that Iran’s stockpiling of 250 kilograms of uranium enriched to almost 20 percent levels was a red line. Experts considered Iran to be just months away from that benchmark at the time, but suddenly enrichment activities were adjusted, avoiding any test of Netanyahu’s threats.

Now, Iran may think Netanyahu has been boxed in, and will feel less compelled to take his warnings seriously. Such an over-confident tone is understandable given Iran’s brilliant accomplishment in negotiating the interim deal. But overconfidence could lead Iran to undertake exactly the kind of action in its nuclear program that Israel is likely to interpret as crossing a red line. It is all speculation of course, but as far as speculation goes, the likelihood of an Israeli pre-emptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities has just gone up, not down.

Dr. Emanuele Ottolenghi is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He is a columnist for Standpoint Magazine and the author, most recently, of "The Pasdaran: Inside Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps" (FDD Press, 2011).


http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/how-a-weak-iran-deal-makes-us-all-less-safe-and-war-more-likely/
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BeitragVerfasst am: Di Feb 04, 2014 08:02:10 
Titel: ungemütliche Nachrichten
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zum Thema Nukleare Proliferation generell…und im Speziellen

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/NuclearMonitoringAndVerificationTechnologies.pdf

kommentiert hier…

Zitat:


Dancing in the Nuclear Dark

How will we know when Iran sprints toward a bomb?

By BRET STEPHENS

Feb. 3, 2014 7:50 p.m. ET

Where do federal government reports go once they've been published and (lightly) chewed over by second-tier officials, congressional staffers and think-tank wonks? I picture them being packed into crates and stored in some vast warehouse, like the Ark of the Covenant in the last scene of "Indiana Jones."

Every now and again, however, some of these reports are worth rescuing from premature burial.

So it is with the "Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies," the soporific title given to a report published last month by the Pentagon's Defense Science Board. The report is long on phrases like "adaptable holistic methodologies" and "institutionalized interagency planning processes." But at its heart it makes three timely and terrifying claims.

First, we are entering a second nuclear age.

Second, the history of nuclear proliferation is no guide to the future.

Third, our ability to detect nuclear breakout—the point at which a regime decides to go for a bomb—is not good.


On the first point, consider: Last year Japan and Turkey signed a nuclear cooperation deal, which at Turkish insistence included "a provision allowing Turkey to enrich uranium and extract plutonium, a potential material for nuclear weapons," according to the Asahi Shimbun newspaper. Japan, for its part, hopes to open a $21 billion reprocessing center at Rokkasho later this year, which will be"capable of producing nine tons of weapons-usable plutonium annually . . . enough to build as many as 2,000 bombs," according to a report in this newspaper. The Saudis are openly warning the administration that they will get a bomb if Iran's nuclear programs aren't stopped: Saudi billionaire Prince Alwaleed bin Talal speaks of the kingdom's "arrangement with Pakistan." Seoul is pressing Washington to allow it to build uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities, a request Washington is resisting.

Think of that: The administration is prepared to consent to an Iranian "right to enrich" but will not extend the same privilege to South Korea, an ally of more than 60 years. It isn't fun being friends with America these days.

On the second point, here's the board's discomfiting takeaway: "The pathways to proliferation are expanding. Networks of cooperation among countries that would otherwise have little reason to do so, such as the A.Q. Khan network or the Syria-North Korea and Iran-North Korea collaborations, cannot be considered isolated events. Moreover, the growth in nuclear power world-wide offers more opportunity for 'leakage' and/or hiding small programs."

And that may not be the worst of it. At least A.Q. Khan was working for a Pakistani government over which the U.S. could exercise leverage. But what leverage does Washington have over "Office 99," which handles Pyongyang's proliferation networks? What leverage would we have with Tehran should one of its nuclear scientists go rogue?

In the Iranian nuclear negotiations the administration is assuming that a regime as famously fractious as the Islamic Republic will nonetheless maintain rigid controls over its nuclear assets. Why is that assumption good?

Finally, there is the matter of nuclear detection. In his 2012 debate with Paul Ryan, Joe Biden insisted that the Iranians "are a good way away" from a bomb and that "we'll know if they start the process of building a weapon."

The report junks that claim. "The observables are limited, typically ambiguous, and part of a high-clutter environment of unrelated activities," it notes. "At low levels associated with small or nascent [nuclear] programs, key observables are easily masked."

Bottom line: We are dancing in the nuclear dark.

Now the administration is pressing for an agreement with Iran based on the conceit that the intelligence community will give policy makers ample warning before the mullahs sprint for a nuclear weapon. That is not true. Iran could surprise the world with a nuclear test at least as easily as India did in 1998, when the intelligence community gave the Clinton administration zero warning that New Delhi was about to set off a bomb—and a South Asian arms race. That failure is especially notable given that India, unlike Iran, is an open society.

Yet even that's not the essence of the problem. "You can't correct for bad policy with excellent intelligence," says Henry Sokolski of the Washington-based Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. U.S. intelligence may or may not be able to provide this administration with the necessary facts at the right time. But Joe Biden and John Kerry are not going to give this president the necessary will to do the right thing.

"The actual or threatened acquisition of nuclear weapons by more actors, for a range of different reasons, is emerging in numbers not seen since the first two decades of the Cold War," the board warns. "Many of these actors are hostile to the U.S. and its allies, and they do not appear to be bound by established norms nor deterred by traditional means."

How fitting that this is happening on the watch of Barack Obama, the man who chases the dream of a world without nuclear weapons.


www.wsj.com
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BeitragVerfasst am: Mi Feb 05, 2014 20:53:56 
Titel: No….
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mehr hat er nicht gebraucht, der Herr Zarif, als den Holocaust in eh schon sehr "blumigem Farsi" als das anzuerkennen was er ist…

jetzt zitiert in die Mullahgang vor das "Parlament", und stellt ihn zur Rede..

http://derstandard.at/1389859355864/Irans-Aussenminister-muss-zu-Holocaust-Verurteilung-Stellung-nehmen

da hat sich gar nix geändert im Iran ,nach der Wahl vom Rouhani..

http://www.wienerzeitung.at/meinungen/gastkommentare/606588_Nie-wieder-ist-zu-wenig....html
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BeitragVerfasst am: Fr Feb 21, 2014 18:37:30 
Titel: Die feuchten Träume
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der Islamofaschisten in Teheran…

wichtig, immer daran zu erinnern…

http://www.ortneronline.at/?p=27279

http://www.achgut.com/dadgdx/index.php/dadgd/article/feuchte_traeume_iranischer_massenmordvorbereiter
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BeitragVerfasst am: Mi Feb 26, 2014 17:23:50 
Titel: während die
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die neue PR Truppe des Islamistenregimes hier in Wien eine Sales & Marketingshow abgezogen haben…

http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/iran-nuclear-charades-in-vienna/

hat die Hardcoregang zu Haus in Teheran mit dem Kim seinen Leuten mit neuen Raketen gespielt…

http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/the-irgc-challenges-rouhani-on-missile-tests-pyongyang-visit/
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BeitragVerfasst am: Fr März 21, 2014 15:07:46 
Titel: Also das ist echt "SELTSAM"
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Iraner bauen US Flugzeugträger nach: ORF.AT
Ein Bild gibt´s auch schon:

Ist schon 1. April?
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BeitragVerfasst am: Do Apr 24, 2014 07:21:51 
Titel: zu der Mörderbande
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möcht jetzt unser spätpubertäres Aussenministerbubi auf einen "Freundschaftsbesuch" Besuch fahren..

und UHBP Heinz Fischer ist, wie man so hört auch schon ganz scharf darauf den Herrn Rouhani und Khameini in Teheran freundschaftlich an den Kittel zu greifen…

Die offizielle österreichische Poilitik will wieder einmal, wie so oft schon, die Sicherheitspolitik des Westens untergraben...



Zitat:


Rouhani's Republic of Fear

Security forces administered a mass beating to political prisoners in Iran.


April 23, 2014 3:34 p.m. ET

Ward 350 of Tehran's Evin prison houses some of Iran's most prominent dissidents, including human-rights lawyers, labor leaders and opposition bloggers. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the intelligence ministry raided the ward last week and administered a mass beating to its residents, landing dozens of prisoners in the hospital.

That's according to family members of the prisoners and news accounts from Kalame, a website associated with opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi. Kalame on Tuesday published what it claimed was a firsthand account of the assault on Ward 350 written by Emad Bahavar, a supporter of the opposition Green movement serving a 10-year sentence for his activism.

Mr. Bahavar's letter, sent from Evin, is worth quoting at some length for the portrait it paints of Mr. Rouhani's Iran. "It feels as though pain has engulfed my entire body," Mr. Bahavar writes. "They covered our eyes and cuffed our wrists. . . . They lined us up in the Ward 350 corridor, our faces to the wall. I could hear some crying in pain. . . . They started beating our backs very severely with batons. The screaming and crying got louder."

The security forces next formed a "tunnel" running from the ward's main entrance to a minibus outside, according to Mr. Bahavar. The guards, some uniformed and some wearing civilian clothes, beat the prisoners as they ran down this tunnel. "The whole route . . . was covered in blood," Mr. Bahavar reports. The minibus drove some of the prisoners away, while others like Mr. Bahavar were returned to the ward and eventually allowed to see a prison medic.

It's notable that Mr. Bahavar, like many Green-movement supporters, initially embraced Hasan Rouhani's candidacy for president: "Rouhani came, and we thought we'd forgive what had happened to us if he improves the people's condition." But the beating he and the other inmates received last week convinced Mr. Bahavar that "the hatred in their black hearts is much greater than the Greens' kindness and forbearance."

Western governments have treated Mr. Rouhani as the great moderate hope—an Iranian version of China's Deng Xiaoping. They forget that Mr. Rouhani has been a lifelong security apparatchik, having helped engineer the regime's bloody 1999 crackdown on Iran's student movement. His government also bans Twitter (except for its public officials) and is setting modern records for the number of public executions. And unlike Deng, whom Mao purged, Mr. Rouhani has always been part of the regime's inner circle.

Perhaps a regime, and a president, that can brutalize political dissidents as a matter of routine can prove reasonable at the nuclear negotiating table. We wouldn't count on it, and neither should the West.


http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304518704579519382260229854?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052702304518704579519382260229854.html
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BeitragVerfasst am: So Apr 27, 2014 08:00:44 
Titel: wozu soll die dämliche
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Reise vom Kurz nach Teheran dienen…?

Aha, ja…was gaaanz Wichtiges..

Zitat:
….Die Reise, die offiziell vor allem dazu dient, einen bevorstehenden Besuch von Bundespräsident Heinz Fischer vorzubereiten, ist durchaus heikel…….


http://derstandard.at/1397521747818/Kurz-zu-Besuch-in-Teheran-eingetroffen
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BeitragVerfasst am: So Apr 27, 2014 15:39:03 
Titel: Auch Schweizer Parlamentarier...
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...waren auf Iran- "Reisli":

http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/schweiz/luzi-stamm-bestaetigt-kritik-an-sanktionen-1.18288982

Für die SVP offenbar ein Gebot der Stunde, so die Neutralität der Schweiz zu demonstrieren.
Sonst gibt man sich in der SVP meistens weit weniger "neutral", wenn es um islamische Anliegen geht, siehe z.B. Minarettinitiative.

Euer Aussenminister hat dort die Menschenrechte und die Todesstrafe thematisiert und sich für den Dialog zur Religionsfreiheit eingesetzt. Das sind im Vergleich zu den Motiven unserer Parlamentarierdelegation, welche primär die Sanktionen von USA und EU kritisierten, geradezu lobenswerte Anliegen.
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BeitragVerfasst am: Mo Apr 28, 2014 09:23:02 
Titel: Re: Auch Schweizer Parlamentarier...
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m.ileduets hat folgendes geschrieben:
Euer Aussenminister hat dort die Menschenrechte und die Todesstrafe thematisiert und sich für den Dialog zur Religionsfreiheit eingesetzt. Das sind im Vergleich zu den Motiven unserer Parlamentarierdelegation, welche primär die Sanktionen von USA und EU kritisierten, geradezu lobenswerte Anliegen.

Jo, der ist besser als erwartet. Was angesichts der absurden Anwürfe zu seiner Bestellung und der nicht vorhandenen Erwartungshaltung auch nicht soooo schwierig war. Aber immerhin; zumindest bisher hat er sich keinen Fauxpas geleistet. Werdet´s schon sehen; über KURZ wink oder lang ist der Bundeskanzler; naja, da gäb´s schlimmeres.
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BeitragVerfasst am: Di Apr 29, 2014 18:40:53 
Titel: da schau her...
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sogar die Harrer im "Der Standard" hat ab und zu "lichte" Momente zum Thema…

http://derstandard.at/1397522040986/Bitte-rufen-Sie-nicht-mehr-an
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BeitragVerfasst am: Mi Mai 28, 2014 09:11:17 
Titel: Mullah Nukes Refresher...
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Zitat:


Iran's Nuclear Masters

Tehran has kept its core team of weaponization researchers intact.

May 27, 2014 2:09 p.m. ET

The International Atomic Energy Agency and Iran last week issued a joint statement in which Tehran pledged to apprise the Agency of "the initiation of high explosives, including the conduct of large scale high explosives experimentation in Iran." In a word: weaponization, the most secretive dimension of the Iranian nuclear program. Tehran's willingness to broach the topic will be hailed by supporters of the current talks as a sign that they're yielding results.

Yet Iran has thus far dismissed as "fabrications" evidence of its weaponization work compiled by the IAEA. We'll believe honest disclosures of prior weaponization activity when we see them. More to the point, we've obtained a plausible new report from the Mujahedeen-e Khalq, an Iranian opposition group, suggesting that Tehran has kept active and intact its core team of weaponization researchers.

The Islamic Republic's attempts to develop a nuclear explosive device date to the late 1980s, when the regime established a Defense Ministry-linked physics research center in Tehran, according to Western intelligence agencies. By the next decade, according to the IAEA, the regime would consolidate its weaponization researchers under an initiative called the "AMAD Plan," headed by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a Ph.D. nuclear engineer and senior member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The AMAD Plan was charged with procuring dual-use technologies, developing nuclear detonators and conducting high-explosive experiments associated with compressing fissile material, according to Western intelligence agencies. The AMAD Plan's most intense period of activity was in 2002-03, according to the IAEA, when current President Hasan Rouhani headed Iran's Supreme National Security Council before becoming its chief nuclear negotiator.

Feeling the heat from the MEK's disclosure of two nuclear facilities in 2002 and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the mullahs apparently halted the AMAD Plan's activities in late 2003. But Mr. Fakhrizadeh and his scientists didn't stop their weaponization work. As former United Nations weapons inspector David Albright told us, "Fakhrizadeh continued to run the program in the military industry, where you could work on nuclear weapons." Much of the work, including theoretical explosive modeling, was shifted to Defense Ministry-linked universities, such as Malek Ashtar University of Technology in Tehran.

Mr. Fakhrizadeh has continued to oversee these disparate and highly compartmentalized activities, now under the auspices of Iran's new Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, known by its Persian acronym, SPND. The MEK first disclosed the SPND's existence in 2011. Now the opposition group has obtained what it says are key new biographical details and the first photograph of the 56-year-old Mr. Fakhrizadeh, whom Iran has refused to make available to the IAEA for long-sought interviews.

The MEK has also compiled a list of what it says are 100 SPND researchers. Far from disbanding the SPND, the MEK alleges, the Tehran regime has kept its nucleus of researchers intact. Possibly to avoid detection by the IAEA, the MEK says, the regime recently relocated the SPND's headquarters from Mojdeh Avenue in Tehran to Pasdaran Avenue. "The new site," the MEK adds, "is located in between several centers and offices affiliated to the Defense Ministry . . . , the Union of IRGC, the sports organization of the Defense Ministry . . . and Chamran Hospital."

To further mask the illicit nature of the relocation from the IAEA, the MEK says, "parts of Malek Ashtar University's logistical activities were transferred to the former site of SPND. The objective was to avoid closing [the former] center, and in the event of inspections, to claim that the site has always had the current formation." Don't expect the regime to fess up to much of this by the August 25 deadline set in its joint communique with the IAEA.

The fact that the IAEA and the Western powers are now turning to the weaponization question is a sign of how far the Iranian nuclear-weapons program has progressed. As the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center's Henry Sokolski, a former nonproliferation director at the Pentagon, told us: "A concern about weaponization followed by testing and use is the moral hazard when you don't pay attention to fissile-material production."

In other words, having ceded a right to enrich and permitted the Islamic Republic to develop an advanced enrichment capability, the West is now left with preventing weaponization as the final barrier against a nuclear-capable Iran. The diplomacy of Mr. Rouhani and his Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, is intended to soothe jittery Western nerves on weaponization.

That palliative effect will be reinforced by the IAEA's latest quarterly report, also released last week, in which the Agency reported that Iran has sharply reduced its stock of 20% uranium and hasn't enriched above 5% since the November interim agreement took effect. The report also highlights the Islamic Republic's new willingness to address at a technical level the "possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program," including Tehran's development of exploding bridge-wire detonators and high-explosives testing.

But if past is precedent and the MEK's new disclosures are to be believed, Mr. Fakhrizadeh will continue to do his work as he has to this day. The snake may shed its skin but not its temper, runs an old Persian proverb.


http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303480304579576071061574700?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052702303480304579576071061574700.html
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BeitragVerfasst am: Mo Jun 02, 2014 06:14:43 
Titel: Dass man von Seiten
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des Mullahregimes die Entwicklung von Atomraketen nicht aufgeben will und wird, ist an sich klar..

Die Frage ist, wie kann man das doch verhindern…? Weil, wenn man das zulässt, dass das Regime im Iran Nukes einmal hat, dann wird es sehr ungemütlich auf dieser Welt, wie wir sie kennen...

Ein aktueller Kommentar, anhand der Besprechung eines Buches, das ich hier in den Thread schon einmal erwähnt hab…der Kommentar richtet sich als Kirtik an die diplomatische Verhandlungsführung der USA selbst, und da eben der Obama Administration..

Bei uns hier, naja, in Österreich muten solche Meinungen, speziell für das offizielle Österreich, natürlich an wie von einem fernen Planeten..

Gerade deshalb sind sie auch für uns aktuell und sollten die Entscheidungsträger sowas auch mal lesen…

Zitat:



BOOKSHELF

The Engagement Trap

Negotiating with rogue regimes often rewards bad behavior and confers legitimacy on illegitimate actors. Oren Kessler reviews Michael Rubin's 'Dancing With the Devil.'

By OREN KESSLER

June 1, 2014 4:21 p.m. ET

In Washington, engagement is a word very much in vogue. While campaigning for president in 2008, Barack Obama insisted that the U.S. must "talk to its enemies" and blasted his predecessor's "ridiculous" policy of shunning America's worst adversaries. Since coming to office, Mr. Obama has followed through on his campaign vows, reaching out to Iran, Russia and China, to the chagrin of traditional allies such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Japan.

In "Dancing With the Devil," Michael Rubin makes the opposite case: that engaging with rogue regimes often exacts heavier costs than not and, worse, can make war with them more likely. "Diplomats diving into negotiations with rogues," Mr. Rubin writes, "are like compulsive gamblers who, no matter how much they lose, believe that one more round might reverse their fortunes."

Engaging with rogues, the author argues in this exhaustive assessment of U.S. diplomatic policy, squanders precious time, momentum and leverage. It rewards bad behavior—states that play by the rules never get the same attention—and confers legitimacy on illegitimate actors. And once begun, engagement is seldom dialed back: Unlike rogues, Western negotiators are generally loath to walk away, lest they be seen as having failed.

Mr. Rubin is a Persian speaker who spent several months in the 1990s living in Iran. Western missteps with the Islamic Republic—such as granting overgenerous concessions that Tehran then pockets as starting points for the next round of nuclear talks—are a recurring motif of this book. Mr. Obama's apparent indication that he would accept some level of Iranian nuclear enrichment, in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions, is a case in point. "Rather than enable diplomacy, he poisoned it," the author writes. "Iranian strategists concluded that defiance pays."

Mr. Rubin, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a former Pentagon official, draws a distinction in his book between governments that are unsavory—even repellent—and genuine rogues. Saudi Arabia is an illustrative example: an absolute monarchy that bans churches and synagogues, prohibits women from driving and publicly beheads people for crimes from "sorcery" to "sodomy." Saudi Arabia is, by the author's reckoning, a medieval place. But it is also one whose leaders adhere to the norms of international conduct and therefore is no rogue.

Iran's leadership, by contrast, has been the world's archetypal rogue ever since it trampled the norms of diplomacy by taking U.S. Embassy workers hostage after the country's 1979 revolution. Since then, Tehran's reckless international behavior—its support for terror groups including Hezbollah and Hamas, its assassination campaigns against dissidents and world leaders beyond Iranian borders, and its decades-long record of nuclear deception—has kept it firmly in the rogues gallery.

Pakistan also earns a place on the list, for the inordinate power of its rogue intelligence agency, which time and again has been caught in bed with the Taliban, al Qaeda and sundry other terrorists. North Korea completes the roster of contemporary governments that have unequivocally gone rogue.

The concept of rogue states is of recent origin. The U.S. State Department first started labeling governments as state sponsors of terrorism in the late 1970s. Inaugural members of the club included Baathist Iraq and Syria, Moammar Gadhafi's Libya and Communist South Yemen. It was during Bill Clinton's presidency, however, that "rogue" came into common political usage. Rogues, the Clinton administration concluded, were global actors that operated outside international norms, and an entirely different diplomatic tool kit was required for dealing with them.

But since then, the author writes, officials from both U.S. parties have fallen into the engagement trap. The very structure of America's foreign-policy apparatus has itself contributed to the problem: The State Department, Mr. Rubin laments, tends to view engagement as its very raison d'être. After all, if the metric for success is merely sitting down and talking, it's easy for diplomats to claim progress. When was the last time the State Department described negotiations as anything other than "productive," "constructive" or "useful"? Surely more than a few have been unproductive, unconstructive and emphatically useless.

Mr. Rubin's argument is not that military force and sanctions are the only reliable means of diplomacy; both come with heavy costs. But the costliness of those two options, he maintains, does not therefore mean that dialogue is always the solution. Rather, timing is everything. The fall of the Soviet Union, for example, opened world-wide diplomatic opportunities for the West that had previously been unthinkable. Egypt's Anwar Sadat only made peace with Israel after concluding that it couldn't be destroyed militarily; in Mr. Rubin's words, Sadat "sought engagement only after trying war."

Equally important is leverage. Victory in the first Gulf War, for instance, gave the West leverage in dealing with the Palestine Liberation Organization, which during the war had backed Saddam Hussein. Or take the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, which prompted Gadhafi to relinquish his nuclear-weapons program and Iran to temporarily suspend its own. In each of these cases, Western shows of strength convinced rogue actors that their interests lay in international cooperation rather than confrontation.

The lessons of such diplomatic achievements are clear: Consider well the costs before dining with the world's worst leaders. Choose the time wisely and set the table with at least as much vinegar as honey. Most important: If your guest begins stealing silverware or smashing plates, be prepared to get up and leave.

Mr. Kessler is a Middle East research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.


http://online.wsj.com/articles/the-engagement-trap-1401654072
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BeitragVerfasst am: Sa Jul 19, 2014 21:44:43 
Titel: und was will dieser Herr Fischer
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im Iran???

Hat er vom Herrn Putin Instruktionen bekommen, oder wie darf man das verstehen??

http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/3841215/Fischer-plant-IranReise-im-September?_vl_backlink=/home/index.do

sehr komische Figur, dieser Herr Fischer…

eine Peinlichkeit sondergleichen an der Spiitze eines Staates, der sich zumindest auf dem Papier den westlichen Grundwerten von Freiheit, Demokratie und Rechtsstaat verschrieben hat…


Zitat:
….Angesichts der skandalösen Vorgänge in der Ostukraine wirkt der Empfang für Putin in Wien nur noch peinlich. Doch Heinz Fischer plant schon den nächsten Alleingang ins Rampenlicht – nach Teheran….


http://diepresse.com/home/meinung/kommentare/leitartikel/3841282/Die-Inflation-der-Weltkrisen-und-Fischers-Beitrag
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BeitragVerfasst am: Do Okt 09, 2014 20:54:32 
Titel: sind das die Freunde
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von UHBP Fischer, die er so gerne besuchen möchte?????
Ich hoffe er wird das nicht im Namen der Republik Österreich machen...

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/iran-president-rouhani-offers-help-to-russia/508073.html

http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Irans-Khamenei-vows-Zionist-regime-and-its-supporters-will-go-extinct-378012
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BeitragVerfasst am: Do Okt 09, 2014 21:30:20 
Titel: während es in Parchin
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mal wieder vernehmlich gekracht hat…

http://www.janes.com/article/44257/satellite-imagery-shows-parchin-explosion-aftermath

die Frage ist, gehen den Mullahs jetzt bereits kleine Nukes beim Test hoch…oder lässt es jemand krachen..?
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BeitragVerfasst am: Mi Feb 25, 2015 10:59:25 
Titel: News from the Nukesfront...
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Zitat:
...Iranisches Atomprogramm

Das Kap und die Bombe

Iran versucht in Südafrika, an Kernwaffentechnologie zu gelangen. Der israelische und der südafrikanische Geheimdienst wollen das gemeinsam unterbinden……..

…...Der Grund aber, warum die Israelis die Südafrikaner an dieser nicht neuen Information teilhaben lassen, sind die hartnäckigen Versuche iranischer Emissäre, in Südafrika sowohl an Raketen als auch an Atomwaffentechnologie zu gelangen. Ersteres produziert der staatliche südafrikanische Waffenkonzern Denel, zweiteres liegt im Forschungsreaktor Pelindaba bei Pretoria unter Verschluss…...


http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/iranisches-atomprogramm-das-kap-und-die-bombe-13447558.html
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BeitragVerfasst am: Fr Feb 27, 2015 14:02:59 
Titel: warum schlägt mein Herz höher,
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wenn ich diesen Flieger sehe wink

http://www.austrianwings.info/2015/02/iran-modernisiert-f-14-jets/

Wobei ich behaupte zu sagen, dass die Modernierungen aufgrund fehlenden Knowhows relativ bescheiden sein dürften.
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BeitragVerfasst am: Fr Feb 27, 2015 21:39:19 
Titel: Re: warum schlägt mein Herz höher,
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StefanT hat folgendes geschrieben:
wenn ich diesen Flieger sehe wink

http://www.austrianwings.info/2015/02/iran-modernisiert-f-14-jets/

Wobei ich behaupte zu sagen, dass die Modernierungen aufgrund fehlenden Knowhows relativ bescheiden sein dürften.

Davon kann man wohl ausgehen.
Tröste dich, mir gehts genauso; wir sehen einfach darin keinen alten Flieger, sondern immer noch mit der F-15 den besten Air superiority fighter. Durch die bloße Präsenz dieser Typen kippte die Balance im Kalten Krieg auf unsere Seite und der WAPA zerbröselte.
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