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BeitragVerfasst am: Di März 03, 2015 10:19:13 
Titel: "Russia's Missile Gambit…"
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Zitat:


Russia’s Missile Gambit

Offering antiballistic missiles to Iran, currying favor with the mullahs.

By JOHN VINOCUR
Updated March 2, 2015 8:22 p.m. ET

From deep in a world of wishful thinking, the White House’s press secretary, Josh Earnest, said on Friday that the Obama administration is hopeful of holding together “the unanimity of support” it is getting from countries described as a coalition working together to stop Iran’s rush toward nuclear weapons.

Was the White House closed for a spiritual retreat earlier in the week? Because last Monday, Russia offered to sell the Islamic Republic its most advanced S-300VM Antey-2500 antiballistic missiles. They would protect the mullahs’ nuclear installations from eventual strikes by Israel and/or—you couldn’t have forgotten President Barack Obama’s warnings that “everything remains on the table”—the United States.

Here was an extraordinary moment that roused barely a peep from the administration and piddling press coverage in the U.S., France, Britain and Germany, the countries that make up with Russia and China the American-led group negotiating with Tehran.

Extraordinary because Moscow deliberately picked a decisive phase in the bargaining process to send a brazen signal. And a coherent one in the sense that its gesture was one of unmistakable contempt for the U.S. and the West.

Most important, the missile proposition was immediately destabilizing since it savaged the notion, cherished in Washington and Western Europe, that the Kremlin is committed to compartmentalizing its approach to Iran—that is, walling it off into a cooperative sanitary zone away from the lies, maneuvers and gun-in-hand Russian strategy concerning Ukraine and the security of Europe.

Instead, the move said the Russians think they can both oppose Iran getting nukes and, through the offer of the missiles, come out from the current talks, concluding at the end of March, with the mullahs on their side regardless of the negotiations’ results. That’s hardly a Tehran moving closer to America, an event which the Obama administration seems to fantasize will accompany a deal.

For emphasis, Vladimir Putin ’s old KGB pal, Sergei Chemezov, head of the Russian state-weapons conglomerate Rostec, personally proposed supplying the missiles. Add this dose of spite: Mr. Chemezov is on Washington’s Crimea sanctions list. He said the Iranians are thinking the offer over.

The Antey-2500 missiles are a substantially improved version of the S-300V the Russians contracted to sell to Iran in 2007. The deal was cancelled by Russia in 2010 after a United Nations Security Council resolution banning the sale or transfer to Iran of missile systems. Russian accounts say the Antey-2500 missiles on offer aren’t listed among the excluded systems.

The U.S. reaction was of the don’t-bother-us mode. “It’s just some reports,” said the State Department’s spokeswoman, Jen Psaki. Apparently the direct quotes from Mr. Chemezov via a Russian state-run news agency, stating that “We offered the Antey-2500 instead of the S-300,” don’t count.

Ms. Psaki issued a clause saying maybe-we’ll-take-a-look-later-at-an-appropriate-level, as if to cut off the story’s legs.

A good way to evaluate the Obama administration’s connection with reality on dealing with Iran was once to check this or that potentially deluded aspect with the French. They hadn’t inexactly called themselves “the guardians of the temple” on nuclear proliferation. Example: In 2013, when an interim agreement was about to be signed setting up the current talks with Iran, France successfully insisted that neutralization of the mullahs’ Arak nuclear site be included. America was prepared to leave it out.

And for verbal resolve on Iran, you couldn’t do better than when President François Hollande told Saudi Arabia’s royals in 2013 that France sought “the certainty, the guarantee that Iran definitively renounces atomic weapons.”

But now, when I asked a senior French official participating in the Iran negotiations about the Russian missile gambit and its implications, he responded: “Juridically, they can do it.” He added, “Politically, we’re not following it now.”

Talk about compartmentalization. The lessons of Russia’s march into Ukraine or its maneuvers on NATO’s borders won’t be superimposed onto Paris’s strategy for dealing with Iran, marking a French willingness, more in line with Washington’s, to disconnect from the issue’s widest realities.

So where are the French “guardians of the temple” these days, the ornery nuclear nags previously ready, they said, to lie across the tracks of an ambiguous or plainly bad deal that would leave Iran with an eventual good shot at nukes?

George Perkovich, the nuclear-security-and-proliferation expert who is vice president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told me, referring to the “guardians” and Iran: “It’s become a different world. The circumstances and issues in the negotiations are not nearly as propitious as they once saw them.”

Russia apart—although the West’s unwillingness to deal with Moscow’s new disruptiveness on Iran says a lot about how it will ultimately face up to the mullahs—I wanted to know from the French how they see things turning out.

“The question for us is not Obama versus Netanyahu,” the senior French official said, seeking to return to the old sound of French noncompromise and autonomy on an issue of enormous importance. “The question is a weak agreement against a robust one. At this stage, the agreement with Iran currently under discussion is not robust.”

He added very diplomatically, “Of course, in three weeks, we’ll see.”

Mr. Vinocur is former executive editor of the International Herald Tribune.


www.wsj.com
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BeitragVerfasst am: Di März 03, 2015 19:48:10 
Titel: gute Ansprache
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meiner Meinung nach…gibt es eigentlich nix hinzuzufügen..

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TX_LebGdibs
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BeitragVerfasst am: Fr Apr 03, 2015 13:42:33 
Titel: und er hat
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auch jetzt, was "Lausanne" betrifft aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach Recht…

Zitat:
….. Netanyahu blieb bei seiner Einschätzung, das Mullah-Regime sei mit den Mitteln westlicher Rationalität nicht zu fassen und potenziell gefährlich…….

…...Die Lausanner Eckpunkte legitimierten das iranische Atomprogramm, stärkten die iranische Wirtschaft und förderten die iranische Aggression im ganzen Nahen Osten. Ein solcher Deal blockiere nicht den Weg zur Bombe, er ebne ihn. Das Risiko nuklearer Proliferation und von Krieg in der ganzen Region werde erhöht……….


http://www.nzz.ch/international/ein-historischer-fehler-1.18515779

Zitat:
…..

What is the international community's past experience with predictions of breakout time?

History shows surprises. The Russian centrifuge program went for years without detection despite tremendous intelligence efforts. The Iraqi and Libyan programs were not immediately detected, and South Africa, which manufactured nuclear weapons, ended up destroying its program before the IAEA saw it. The Syrian reactor in al-Kibar also came a bit out of the blue, as did North Korea's advanced centrifuge plant. There is always the element of the unknown or the uncertain that adds to the risk equation.

Iran has talented engineers and the necessary financial resources, and its nuclear infrastructure is much larger than what it actually needs. Therefore, a monitoring scheme that is merely "good enough" will not guarantee success in preventing Iran from breaking out and achieving a nuclear weapons capability……...


http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-nuclear-breakout-time-a-fact-sheet

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/experts/view/olli-heinonen
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BeitragVerfasst am: Mo Apr 06, 2015 20:45:40 
Titel: auch zwei sehr
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lesbare Artikel hier..

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/keep-calm-and-keep-an-eye-on-iran/518685.html

http://www.nukeklaus.de/home/neuer-beitragstitel/
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BeitragVerfasst am: Di Apr 07, 2015 21:53:32 
Titel: laut Infos
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der NZZ nicht einmal als Klopapier verwendbar, was da in Lausanne "vereinbart" wurde…

also uninteressant

http://www.nzz.ch/international/naher-osten-und-nordafrika/schoenfaerberei-von-allen-seiten-1.18516831
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BeitragVerfasst am: Mi Apr 08, 2015 11:15:23 
Titel: "Wo bleibt denn der Whiskey?"
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das ist hier die Frage…

http://derstandard.at/2000013971519/Wo-bleibt-denn-der-Whisky
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BeitragVerfasst am: Mi Apr 08, 2015 12:02:09 
Titel: die beiden
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"Heavyweights" Henry Kissinger und George P. Shultz bieten hier eine sehr klare und genaue Analyse an..

Zitat:


The Iran Deal and Its Consequences

Mixing shrewd diplomacy with defiance of U.N. resolutions, Iran has turned the negotiation on its head.

By HENRY KISSINGER And GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Updated April 7, 2015 7:38 p.m. ET

The announced framework for an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program has the potential to generate a seminal national debate. Advocates exult over the nuclear constraints it would impose on Iran. Critics question the verifiability of these constraints and their longer-term impact on regional and world stability. The historic significance of the agreement and indeed its sustainability depend on whether these emotions, valid by themselves, can be reconciled.

Debate regarding technical details of the deal has thus far inhibited the soul-searching necessary regarding its deeper implications. For 20 years, three presidents of both major parties proclaimed that an Iranian nuclear weapon was contrary to American and global interests—and that they were prepared to use force to prevent it. Yet negotiations that began 12 years ago as an international effort to prevent an Iranian capability to develop a nuclear arsenal are ending with an agreement that concedes this very capability, albeit short of its full capacity in the first 10 years.


Mixing shrewd diplomacy with open defiance of U.N. resolutions, Iran has gradually turned the negotiation on its head. Iran’s centrifuges have multiplied from about 100 at the beginning of the negotiation to almost 20,000 today. The threat of war now constrains the West more than Iran. While Iran treated the mere fact of its willingness to negotiate as a concession, the West has felt compelled to break every deadlock with a new proposal. In the process, the Iranian program has reached a point officially described as being within two to three months of building a nuclear weapon. Under the proposed agreement, for 10 years Iran will never be further than one year from a nuclear weapon and, after a decade, will be significantly closer.

Inspections and Enforcement

The president deserves respect for the commitment with which he has pursued the objective of reducing nuclear peril, as does Secretary of State John Kerry for the persistence, patience and ingenuity with which he has striven to impose significant constraints on Iran’s nuclear program.

Progress has been made on shrinking the size of Iran’s enriched stockpile, confining the enrichment of uranium to one facility, and limiting aspects of the enrichment process. Still, the ultimate significance of the framework will depend on its verifiability and enforceability.

Negotiating the final agreement will be extremely challenging. For one thing, no official text has yet been published. The so-called framework represents a unilateral American interpretation. Some of its clauses have been dismissed by the principal Iranian negotiator as “spin.” A joint EU-Iran statement differs in important respects, especially with regard to the lifting of sanctions and permitted research and development.

Comparable ambiguities apply to the one-year window for a presumed Iranian breakout. Emerging at a relatively late stage in the negotiation, this concept replaced the previous baseline—that Iran might be permitted a technical capacity compatible with a plausible civilian nuclear program. The new approach complicates verification and makes it more political because of the vagueness of the criteria.

Under the new approach, Iran permanently gives up none of its equipment, facilities or fissile product to achieve the proposed constraints. It only places them under temporary restriction and safeguard—amounting in many cases to a seal at the door of a depot or periodic visits by inspectors to declared sites. The physical magnitude of the effort is daunting. Is the International Atomic Energy Agency technically, and in terms of human resources, up to so complex and vast an assignment?

In a large country with multiple facilities and ample experience in nuclear concealment, violations will be inherently difficult to detect. Devising theoretical models of inspection is one thing. Enforcing compliance, week after week, despite competing international crises and domestic distractions, is another. Any report of a violation is likely to prompt debate over its significance—or even calls for new talks with Tehran to explore the issue. The experience of Iran’s work on a heavy-water reactor during the “interim agreement” period—when suspect activity was identified but played down in the interest of a positive negotiating atmosphere—is not encouraging.

Compounding the difficulty is the unlikelihood that breakout will be a clear-cut event. More likely it will occur, if it does, via the gradual accumulation of ambiguous evasions.

When inevitable disagreements arise over the scope and intrusiveness of inspections, on what criteria are we prepared to insist and up to what point? If evidence is imperfect, who bears the burden of proof? What process will be followed to resolve the matter swiftly?

The agreement’s primary enforcement mechanism, the threat of renewed sanctions, emphasizes a broad-based asymmetry, which provides Iran permanent relief from sanctions in exchange for temporary restraints on Iranian conduct. Undertaking the “snap-back” of sanctions is unlikely to be as clear or as automatic as the phrase implies. Iran is in a position to violate the agreement by executive decision. Restoring the most effective sanctions will require coordinated international action. In countries that had reluctantly joined in previous rounds, the demands of public and commercial opinion will militate against automatic or even prompt “snap-back.” If the follow-on process does not unambiguously define the term, an attempt to reimpose sanctions risks primarily isolating America, not Iran.

The gradual expiration of the framework agreement, beginning in a decade, will enable Iran to become a significant nuclear, industrial and military power after that time—in the scope and sophistication of its nuclear program and its latent capacity to weaponize at a time of its choosing. Limits on Iran’s research and development have not been publicly disclosed (or perhaps agreed). Therefore Iran will be in a position to bolster its advanced nuclear technology during the period of the agreement and rapidly deploy more advanced centrifuges—of at least five times the capacity of the current model—after the agreement expires or is broken.

The follow-on negotiations must carefully address a number of key issues, including the mechanism for reducing Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium from 10,000 to 300 kilograms, the scale of uranium enrichment after 10 years, and the IAEA’s concerns regarding previous Iranian weapons efforts. The ability to resolve these and similar issues should determine the decision over whether or when the U.S. might still walk away from the negotiations.

The Framework Agreement and Long-Term Deterrence

Even when these issues are resolved, another set of problems emerges because the negotiating process has created its own realities. The interim agreement accepted Iranian enrichment; the new agreement makes it an integral part of the architecture. For the U.S., a decade-long restriction on Iran’s nuclear capacity is a possibly hopeful interlude. For Iran’s neighbors—who perceive their imperatives in terms of millennial rivalries—it is a dangerous prelude to an even more dangerous permanent fact of life. Some of the chief actors in the Middle East are likely to view the U.S. as willing to concede a nuclear military capability to the country they consider their principal threat. Several will insist on at least an equivalent capability. Saudi Arabia has signaled that it will enter the lists; others are likely to follow. In that sense, the implications of the negotiation are irreversible.

If the Middle East is “proliferated” and becomes host to a plethora of nuclear-threshold states, several in mortal rivalry with each other, on what concept of nuclear deterrence or strategic stability will international security be based? Traditional theories of deterrence assumed a series of bilateral equations. Do we now envision an interlocking series of rivalries, with each new nuclear program counterbalancing others in the region?

Previous thinking on nuclear strategy also assumed the existence of stable state actors. Among the original nuclear powers, geographic distances and the relatively large size of programs combined with moral revulsion to make surprise attack all but inconceivable. How will these doctrines translate into a region where sponsorship of nonstate proxies is common, the state structure is under assault, and death on behalf of jihad is a kind of fulfillment?

Some have suggested the U.S. can dissuade Iran’s neighbors from developing individual deterrent capacities by extending an American nuclear umbrella to them. But how will these guarantees be defined? What factors will govern their implementation? Are the guarantees extended against the use of nuclear weapons—or against any military attack, conventional or nuclear? Is it the domination by Iran that we oppose or the method for achieving it? What if nuclear weapons are employed as psychological blackmail? And how will such guarantees be expressed, or reconciled with public opinion and constitutional practices?

Regional Order

For some, the greatest value in an agreement lies in the prospect of an end, or at least a moderation, of Iran’s 3½ decades of militant hostility to the West and established international institutions, and an opportunity to draw Iran into an effort to stabilize the Middle East. Having both served in government during a period of American-Iranian strategic alignment and experienced its benefits for both countries as well as the Middle East, we would greatly welcome such an outcome. Iran is a significant national state with a historic culture, a fierce national identity, and a relatively youthful, educated population; its re-emergence as a partner would be a consequential event.

But partnership in what task? Cooperation is not an exercise in good feeling; it presupposes congruent definitions of stability. There exists no current evidence that Iran and the U.S. are remotely near such an understanding. Even while combating common enemies, such as ISIS, Iran has declined to embrace common objectives. Iran’s representatives (including its Supreme Leader) continue to profess a revolutionary anti-Western concept of international order; domestically, some senior Iranians describe nuclear negotiations as a form of jihad by other means.

The final stages of the nuclear talks have coincided with Iran’s intensified efforts to expand and entrench its power in neighboring states. Iranian or Iranian client forces are now the pre-eminent military or political element in multiple Arab countries, operating beyond the control of national authorities. With the recent addition of Yemen as a battlefield, Tehran occupies positions along all of the Middle East’s strategic waterways and encircles archrival Saudi Arabia, an American ally. Unless political restraint is linked to nuclear restraint, an agreement freeing Iran from sanctions risks empowering Iran’s hegemonic efforts.

Some have argued that these concerns are secondary, since the nuclear deal is a way station toward the eventual domestic transformation of Iran. But what gives us the confidence that we will prove more astute at predicting Iran’s domestic course than Vietnam’s, Afghanistan’s, Iraq’s, Syria’s, Egypt’s or Libya’s?

Absent the linkage between nuclear and political restraint, America’s traditional allies will conclude that the U.S. has traded temporary nuclear cooperation for acquiescence to Iranian hegemony. They will increasingly look to create their own nuclear balances and, if necessary, call in other powers to sustain their integrity. Does America still hope to arrest the region’s trends toward sectarian upheaval, state collapse and the disequilibrium of power tilting toward Tehran, or do we now accept this as an irremediable aspect of the regional balance?

Some advocates have suggested that the agreement can serve as a way to dissociate America from Middle East conflicts, culminating in the military retreat from the region initiated by the current administration. As Sunni states gear up to resist a new Shiite empire, the opposite is likely to be the case. The Middle East will not stabilize itself, nor will a balance of power naturally assert itself out of Iranian-Sunni competition. (Even if that were our aim, traditional balance of power theory suggests the need to bolster the weaker side, not the rising or expanding power.) Beyond stability, it is in America’s strategic interest to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and its catastrophic consequences. Nuclear arms must not be permitted to turn into conventional weapons. The passions of the region allied with weapons of mass destruction may impel deepening American involvement.

If the world is to be spared even worse turmoil, the U.S. must develop a strategic doctrine for the region. Stability requires an active American role. For Iran to be a valuable member of the international community, the prerequisite is that it accepts restraint on its ability to destabilize the Middle East and challenge the broader international order.

Until clarity on an American strategic political concept is reached, the projected nuclear agreement will reinforce, not resolve, the world’s challenges in the region. Rather than enabling American disengagement from the Middle East, the nuclear framework is more likely to necessitate deepening involvement there—on complex new terms. History will not do our work for us; it helps only those who seek to help themselves.

Messrs. Kissinger and Shultz are former secretaries of state.


www.wsj.com

http://www.nuclearsecurityproject.org
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BeitragVerfasst am: Mi Apr 08, 2015 14:02:25 
Titel: und wie soll das Ganze
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verifiziert werden..?

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/iran-deal-kerry-flawed-negotiations-close-116623.html#.VSUYYksxJFI
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BeitragVerfasst am: Di Apr 14, 2015 09:01:36 
Titel: Der Putler
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möchte jetzt so schnell wie möglich den Mullahs S-300 liefern…

go figure…

Zitat:


Russian Missiles for the Ayatollah

Vladimir Putin blows a raspberry at Obama.

April 13, 2015 7:15 p.m. ET

Vladimir Putin blew a geopolitical raspberry at the Obama Administration on Monday by authorizing the sale of Russia’s S-300 missile system to Iran. The Kremlin is offering the mullahs an air-defense capability so sophisticated that it would render Iran’s nuclear installations far more difficult and costly to attack should Tehran seek to build a bomb.

Feeling better about that Iranian nuclear deal now?

The origins of this Russian sideswipe go back to 2007, when Moscow and Tehran signed an $800 million contract for delivery of five S-300 squadrons. But in 2010 then-President Dmitry Medvedev stopped the sale under pressure from the U.S. and Israel. The United Nations Security Council the same year passed an arms-embargo resolution barring the sale of major conventional systems to the Tehran regime.

That resolution is still in effect, but the Kremlin no longer feels like abiding by it. With the latest negotiating deadline passed and without any nuclear agreement in place, Moscow will dispatch the S-300s “promptly” to the Islamic Republic, according to the Russian Defense Ministry.

So much for the White House hope that the West could cordon off Russia’s aggression against Ukraine while working with Mr. Putin on other matters. Russia and the West could disagree about Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the thinking went, but Washington could still solicit the Kremlin’s cooperation on the Iranian nuclear crisis.

State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki dismissed news in February that Russia’s state-run weapons conglomerate Rostec had offered Tehran the Antey-2500—an upgraded version of the S-300 system. “It’s just some reports,” she said. White House spokesman Josh Earnest similarly boasted in March of how “international unanimity of opinion has been critical to our ability to apply pressure to Iran.”

Now Mr. Obama wants to delegate responsibility for enforcing his nuclear deal with Iran to the United Nations, which means that the Russians will have a say—and a veto—there, too. Think of this missile sale as a taste of what’s to come.


www.wsj.com

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/13/us-iran-nuclear-russia-idUSKBN0N40YX20150413
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BeitragVerfasst am: Di Apr 14, 2015 09:35:30 
Titel: so is es….
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Zitat:
...The new nuclear arms race: The Iranian negotiations have accelerated the likelihood of proliferation, not reduced it….


http://www.aei.org/publication/the-new-nuclear-arms-race-the-iranian-negotiations-have-accelerated-the-likelihood-of-proliferation-not-reduced-it/
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BeitragVerfasst am: Di Apr 14, 2015 10:13:37 
Titel: der sehr liberale
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"Atlantic" bringt ein Interview mit US Sen. Tom Cotton zum Thema…

bevor man sich eine Meinung bildet anhand der eher dümmlichen und einfältigen Ergüsse der österreichischen (Qualiddäds) Boulevardzeitungen zu diesem Interview sollte man sich das Original durchlesen..

lesenswert..



http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/tom-cotton-obama-iran-deal-may-lead-to-nuclear-war/390327/
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BeitragVerfasst am: Mi Mai 27, 2015 22:39:37 
Titel: dass dieser Herr Pres. Obama
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nicht der Hellsten einer ist, was Sicherheitspolitik für unsere offenen und freiene Gesellschaften betrifft, dämmert seit längerer Zeit sogar schon seinen ehemaligen Wählern in den USA…

gut kommentiert hier im Tschörnl…



Zitat:


The Rational Ayatollah Hypothesis

If President Obama can forgive us our trespasses, he can forgive the Ayatollah Khamenei’s, too.


By BRET STEPHENS

May 25, 2015 6:05 p.m. ET

Can there be a rational, negotiable, relatively reasonable bigot? Barack Obama thinks so.

So we learn from the president’s interview last week with the Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg—the same interview in which Mr. Obama called Islamic State’s capture of Ramadi a “tactical setback.” Mr. Goldberg asked the president to reconcile his view of an Iranian regime steeped in “venomous anti-Semitism” with his claims that the same regime “is practical, and is responsive to incentive, and shows signs of rationality.”

The president didn’t miss a beat. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s strategic objectives, he said, were not dictated by prejudice alone. Sure, the Iranians could make irrational decisions “with respect to trying to use anti-Semitic rhetoric as an organizing tool.” They might also pursue hate-based policies “where the costs are low.” But the regime has larger goals: “maintaining power, having some semblance of legitimacy inside their country,” and getting “out of the deep economic rut that we’ve put them in.”

Also, Mr. Obama reminded Mr. Goldberg, “there were deep strains of anti-Semitism in this country,” to say nothing of Europe. If the president can forgive us our trespasses, he can forgive the ayatollah’s, too.

Perhaps it shouldn’t be surprising that a man with an undergraduate’s enthusiasm for moral equivalency (Islamic State now, the Crusades and Inquisition then) would have sophomoric ideas about the nature and history of anti-Semitism. So let’s recall some basic facts.

Iran has no border, and no territorial dispute, with Israel. The two countries have a common enemy in Islamic State and other radical Sunni groups. Historically and religiously, Jews have always felt a special debt to Persia. Tehran and Jerusalem were de facto allies until 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini came to power and 100,000 Jews still lived in Iran. Today, no more than 10,000 Jews are left.

So on the basis of what self-interest does Iran arm and subsidize Hamas, probably devoting more than $1 billion of (scarce) dollars to the effort? What’s the economic rationale for hosting conferences of Holocaust deniers in Tehran, thereby gratuitously damaging ties to otherwise eager economic partners such as Germany and France? What was the political logic to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s calls to wipe Israel off the map, which made it so much easier for the U.S. and Europe to impose sanctions? How does the regime shore up its domestic legitimacy by preaching a state ideology that makes the country a global pariah?

Maybe all this behavior serves Tehran’s instrumental purposes by putting the regime at the vanguard of a united Shiite-Sunni “resistance” to Western imperialism and Zionism. If so, it hasn’t worked out too well, as the rise of Islamic State shows. The likelier explanation is that the regime believes what it says, practices what it preaches, and is willing to pay a steep price for doing so.

So it goes with hating Jews. There are casual bigots who may think of Jews as greedy or uncouth, but otherwise aren’t obsessed by their prejudices. But the Jew-hatred of the Iranian regime is of the cosmic variety: Jews, or Zionists, as the agents of everything that is wrong in this world, from poverty and drug addiction to conflict and genocide. If Zionism is the root of evil, then anti-Zionism is the greatest good—a cause to which one might be prepared to sacrifice a great deal, up to and including one’s own life.

This was one of the lessons of the Holocaust, which the Nazis carried out even at the expense of the overall war effort. In 1944, with Russia advancing on a broad front and the Allies landing in Normandy, Adolf Eichmann pulled out all stops to deport more than 400,000 Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz in just two months. The Nazis didn’t even bother to make slaves of most of their prisoners to feed their war machine. Annihilation of the Jews was the higher goal.

Modern Iran is not Nazi Germany, or so Iran’s apologists like to remind us. Then again, how different is the thinking of an Eichmann from that of a Khamenei, who in 2012 told a Friday prayer meeting that Israel was a “cancerous tumor that should be cut and will be cut”?

Whether the Ayatollah Khamenei gets to act on his wishes, as Eichmann did, is another question. Mr. Obama thinks he won’t, because the ayatollah only pursues his Jew-hating hobby “at the margins,” as he told Mr. Goldberg, where it isn’t at the expense of his “self-interest.” Does it occur to Mr. Obama that Mr. Khamenei might operate according to a different set of principles than political or economic self-interest? What if Mr. Khamenei believes that some things in life are, in fact, worth fighting for, the elimination of Zionism above all?

In November 2013 the president said at a fundraising event that he was “not a particularly ideological person.” Maybe Mr. Obama doesn’t understand the compelling power of ideology. Or maybe he doesn’t know himself. Either way, the tissue of assumptions on which his Iran diplomacy rests looks thinner all the time.


www.wsj.com

hier bei uns, gibt es auch eine sehr eigenartige Figur in der Politik, unseren UHBP Heinz Fischer….der möcht unbedingt so schnell wie möglich zu der Ayatollah Gang hinfahren…

was will er dort?…fühlt er sich wohl in Gesellschaft von Diktatoren, die Israel vernichten wollen?…sehr komisch...

übel….das Ganze…

http://derstandard.at/2000016461498/Fischer-will-nach-Atom-Deal-in-den-Iran

das einzige Land in Europa, das seine Tassen noch im Schrank hat in der Angelegenheit ist Frankreich….

Gott-sei-Dank…

we'll always have Paris….

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/27/us-iran-nuclear-deadline-idUSKBN0OC0ZZ20150527

Zitat:
...France warned on Wednesday it was ready to block a final deal between Iran and the six major powers on Iran's nuclear program unless Tehran provided inspectors access to all installations, including military sites.

Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, last week ruled out international inspection of Iran's military sites or access to nuclear scientists under any agreement. Iran's military leaders echoed his remarks.

"France will not accept (a deal) if it is not clear that inspections can be done at all Iranian installations, including military sites," French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius told lawmakers in Paris…...

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BeitragVerfasst am: Di Jul 14, 2015 09:09:32 
Titel: Sieg des Iran! Israel kann vernichtet werden!
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Iran erhält Zugang zur gesamten Nuklearwaffentechnologie der USA und darf sofort 1000 Atombomben bauen. eek
Nuklearer Angriff auf Israel steht unmittelbar bevor. eek
Deshalb wird Israel einen sofortigen Präventivschlag gegen den Iran, Saudi-Arabien, die UAE und Europa führen. Rolling Eyes

(c) Israeli News Agency Embarassed
Rolling Eyes wink wink wink
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BeitragVerfasst am: Di Jul 14, 2015 11:16:27 
Titel: naja….
Antworten mit Zitat

das ist noch lange nicht gegessen…

Zustimmung im US Kongress ist sehr schwer vorstellbar..

selbst Parteifreunde von Pres. Obama haben mittlerweile die Nase voll von den epochalen aussenpolitischen Fehl- und Nichtleistungen Obamas….

das Motiv zu einer Einigung zu kommen dürfte wie hier richtig in dem Kommentar in der "Die Presse" geschrieben, Folgendes gewesen sein…

Zitat:
….Doch Illusionen sollte sich niemand hingeben. Im Endstadium der ermüdenden Verhandlungen dürfte eines der Leitmotive ungefähr so gelautet haben: „Hinter uns die Sintflut“. Nicht nur das Abkommen hat eine Ablauffrist, auch das Waffen- und Raketenembargo bleibt lediglich fünf respektive acht Jahre aufrecht. Danach können sich die Mullahs wieder nach Belieben eindecken auf den Rüstungsmärkten. Geld genug werden sie zur Verfügung haben, denn die Ölquellen werden nach Aufhebung der Sanktionen wieder üppig sprudeln.

Besonders naiv jedoch wäre es zu glauben, dass sich das Regime nach dem Abkommen wandelt. Das wird weder auf innen- noch auf außenpolitischer Ebene passieren. Noch während der Verhandlungen in Wien stellte Revolutionsführer Khamenei klar, dass der Kampf „gegen die globale Arroganz der USA“ weitergehe. Und Ex-Präsident Rafsandjani, der vielen als gemäßigt gilt, weil er am Geschäft interessiert ist, kündigte die baldige Auslöschung Israels an. Darüber regte sich dann niemand mehr auf, denn man wollte ja ein Abkommen mit dem Iran.

Und so schön sich manche einen Grand Bargain mit dem Iran im Nahen Osten ausmalen, auch dazu wird es kaum kommen. Die Islamische Republik verficht beinhart ihre Interessen. Sie stützt den syrischen Diktator, schürt den Krieg im Jemen und füttert die Feinde Israels durch – von der libanesischen Hisbollah bis zur palästinensischen Hamas…..


http://diepresse.com/home/meinung/kommentare/4776340/Ein-Deal-der-besser-ist-als-gar-keiner?_vl_backlink=/home/index.do

das ist keine gute Motivation für so ein Abkommen..

Diese diplomatische Fehlleistung wird aber sicher so schmerzhafte Nebenwirkungen haben, dass ein militärischer Konflikt mit dem Mullahregime eher wahrscheinlicher wird..

Also früher oder später wird man dieser Terroristenbande von Regime die Nukes mit Waffengewalt zerstören müssen und das Regime verjagen..

Erst danach wird unsere Welt wieder ein bissel sicherer werden..

http://www.aei.org/publication/in-iran-a-pictures-worth-1000-words/

http://www.irantracker.org

http://www.irantracker.org/nuclear/bucala-day-after-deal-what-to-expect-from-iran-july-13-2015

http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article143988034/Iran-gewinnt-Jackpot-um-Terror-voranzutreiben.html
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BeitragVerfasst am: Di Jul 14, 2015 15:41:18 
Titel: naja……...
Antworten mit Zitat

Zitat:


Russia Contemplates Arms Deliveries to Iran Following Nuclear Deal

Russia's President Vladimir Putin said on Tuesday that the six powers that reached a deal on curbing Iran's nuclear program made a firm choice in favor of stability and cooperation.

"The world can now breathe a sigh of relief," Putin said in a statement on the Kremlin website.

"Despite attempts to justify scenarios based on force, the negotiators have made a firm choice in favor of stability and cooperation."

Putin added that the deal will help Russian-Iranian civilian nuclear cooperation and will contribute to combating terrorism in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that arms deliveries to Tehran will be possible if approved by the United Nations Security Council.

He also said Russia was counting on the United States carrying out a promise, which he said it had made in 2009, not to deploy missile defense systems in Europe once a nuclear deal was reached with Iran.

Saying arms deliveries would be possible to Iran under certain conditions even before an arms embargo expires, he said in comments broadcast from Vienna by Russian television: "In the next five years deliveries of arms to Iran will be possible, under the conditions of the relevant procedures, notification and verification by the U.N. Security Council."


http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-contemplates-arms-deliveries-to-iran-following-nuclear-deal/525605.html

wer solche Ergebnisse und so einen Deal bei uns im Westen für "gut" befindet, hat sie nicht alle, ist entweder grenzdebil, oder hat sich die Birne weichgesoffen oder weichgeraucht in seiner Jugend…

Gut in Österreich werden die "Spitzenpolitiker" den Deal für "gut" befinden, die seit Jahrzehnten offenbar auf der Payroll der Mullahgang gestanden sind…

"zwickt's mi, i man i dram…"
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BeitragVerfasst am: Di Jul 14, 2015 16:38:10 
Titel: Yipp, nur darum ist´s gegangen: Endlich wieder ...
Antworten mit Zitat

Waffen an den Iran zu verkaufen. Jetzt, wo sie wieder flüssig sind, kann man ihnen Minen, Raketen, Luftabwehr bis zur S-500 verhökern, und in Russland damit den Aufschwung ankurbeln und endlich wieder Monetas machen.
Und "Missile defence" für Europa soll´s auch keine geben.
Der dritte Weltkrieg linst schon um die Ecke...
Grexit, Schuldenkrise, alles sch..ßegal, wir hauen mal wieder alles zu Klump, damit wir´s nachher wieder aufbauen können.
Fragt sich was zuerst sein wird:
    - Finanzkollaps wegen GR
    - Flüchtlingsaufstand (bin gespannt, wie lange das in Traiskirchen noch dauert)
    - IS-Expansion nach Europa
    - Anti-Atomschlag durch Israel auf den Iran und dann Atomkrieg

MMN ist das in Traiskirchen nur mehr eine Frage der Zeit, bis der Aufstand kommt. Dann werden die das Lager verlassen, die Einheimischen massakrieren, die Supermärkte ausrauben und die Häuser der erschlagenen Einheimischen besetzen.
Ich glaube langsam, ich kauf mir doch eine Puff´n; bevor ich mich dann erschieß, nehm' ich noch ein paar von den muslimischen Brüdern und maximalpigmentierten Südländern mit...

Bezüglich Iran noch: Was denkt Ihr, wieviele Atombomben bräuchte Israel um dieses ganze vermaledeite Mullah-Regime auszudämpfen? 10, 15? Haben werden sie wohl genug; nur schade um die Golf-Anrainer-Staaten und blöd, das das ganze Öl dann atomar verseucht wäre...
Boahhh: Israel, mach was...
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BeitragVerfasst am: Mi Jul 15, 2015 13:41:07 
Titel: Frederick Kagan
Antworten mit Zitat

beleuchtet in einem Kommentar im "Tschörnl" die massiven Problemstellen in dem Abkommen mit dem Iran…

Zitat:


Why They’re Cheering in Tehran

The nuclear deal is an opaque 159 pages, offering sanctions relief and vague promises of inspections.

By FREDERICK KAGAN

July 14, 2015 7:35 p.m. ET

The nuclear agreement with Iran announced Tuesday is an astoundingly good deal, far surpassing the hopes of anyone . . . in Tehran. It requires Iran to reduce the number of centrifuges enriching uranium by about half, to sell most of its current uranium stockpile or “downblend” it to lower levels of enrichment, and to accept inspections (whose precise nature is yet to be specified) by the International Atomic Energy Agency, something that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had wanted to avoid.

But the agreement also permits Iran to phase out the first-generation centrifuges on which it now relies and focus its research and development by exclusively using a number of advanced centrifuge models many times more efficient, which has been Tehran’s plan all along. The deal will also entirely end the United Nations’ involvement in Iran’s nuclear program in 10 years, and in 15 years will lift most restrictions on the program.

Even that, though, is not Tehran’s biggest win. The main achievement of the regime’s negotiators is striking a deal that commits the West to removing almost all sanctions on Iran, including most of those imposed to reduce terrorism or to prevent weapons proliferation. Most of the sanctions are likely to end in a few months. Thus the agreement ensures that after a short delay Iran will be able to lay the groundwork for a large nuclear arsenal and, in the interim, expand its conventional military capabilities as much as the regime pleases. The supreme leader should be very proud of his team.

The agreement consists of 159 pages of opaque prose, and key sections are referred to but are not clearly marked. Even figuring out the timeline embodied in the deal is hard, but it appears to run about as follows:

“Finalization Day” was July 14. The agreement stipulates that a resolution will be submitted to the United Nations Security Council “promptly after the conclusion of the negotiations . . . for adoption without delay” that will “terminate” all preceding U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iran. The document doesn’t mention the 60-day window for review by the U.S. Congress, and the language in this section suggests that action in the U.N. will not await any congressional vote.

“Adoption Day” is the next major milestone, coming either 90 days after the approval of the Security Council resolution or “at an earlier date by mutual consent.” If the Security Council moves smartly, Adoption Day could come in October. At that point Iran commits to apply the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which governs enhanced international inspections. But this commitment is provisional, “pending ratification by the Majlis”—the Iranian parliament. It is again noteworthy that no mention is made of any action to be taken by the U.S. Congress, despite the nod to Iran’s legislature.

Determining when “Implementation Day” happens is even more difficult, since it depends on the completion of a series of negotiations between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The timeline for those negotiations, however, is spelled out in a separate document: Discussions are to be complete by Oct. 15, 2015, and the IAEA director general will submit a final report to his board of governors by Dec. 15.

Iran at this point will be rewarded. The European Union will end a large number sanctions; President Obama will issue waivers for a number of U.S. sanctions or rescind the executive orders that imposed them. Iranian banks will be allowed back into the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications system, or Swift, allowing Iran to reintegrate into the dollar economy and move money freely.

The agreement also specifies that the EU will lift sanctions against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; the Quds Force and possibly its commander, Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani; and a large number of other individuals and entities sanctioned not simply for their roles in the nuclear program but for terrorism and human-rights abuses. This sanctions relief will come by 2023 at the latest. The agreement does not appear to oblige the U.S. to lift sanctions on those people and entities.

The survival of the international arms embargo against Iran, however, depends entirely on the U.N. Security Council resolution passed to implement this agreement. Nothing in the text of the agreement itself supports President Obama’s assertion that the embargo will last for another five years, although he may have that time frame in mind.

The current embargo was implemented by two resolutions: No. 1696 (2006) and No. 1929 (2010). The first bars the sale or transfer to Iran of any material or technology that might be useful to a ballistic-missile program, and the second does the same for “battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles, or missile systems.”

A new resolution that simply terminates all of the previous sanctions would allow Russia and China to provide Iran with any military technology they choose. To preserve the embargo, the U.S. would need to add the appropriate language to the resolution that must be passed by the Security Council this summer. But that means getting agreement from the Russians, who have already said that the embargo should be ended immediately. The U.S. is not in a very strong position to engage the Russians on this point, since the Obama administration must get the resolution through the Security Council quickly or risk having the entire nuclear deal fall apart.

Experts will debate the value of the concessions Iran has made on the nuclear front, but the value to Iran of the concessions the U.S. has made on nonnuclear issues is immeasurable. It is hard to imagine any other circumstance under which Tehran could have hoped to get an international, U.N. Security Council-backed commitment to remove the Republican Guard and Quds Force from any sanctions list, or to have the fate of the arms embargo placed in the hands of Vladimir Putin.

It is still more remarkable that the agreement says nothing about Iran’s terrorist activities, human-rights violations or role in regional weapons proliferation—all of which were drivers of the embargo in the first place. Iran makes no commitment to change its terrorist or oppressive ways, but the international community promises to eliminate those sanctions anyway.

Nor is there much mystery about what Iran will do with these concessions. Tehran has recently concluded an agreement giving Syria’s Bashar Assad a $1 billion line of credit. The Iranian regime has announced that it is preparing to take delivery of the Russian S-300 antiaircraft missile system. The supreme leader has released a five-year economic plan calling for a significant expansion of Iran’s ballistic-missile and cyberwar programs and an increase in Iran’s defense capabilities.

The Obama administration seems to be betting that lifting sanctions will cause Iran to moderate its behavior in both nuclear and nonnuclear matters. The rhetoric and actions of the regime’s leaders provide little evidence to support this notion and much evidence to the contrary. The likelihood is, therefore, that this agreement will lead to a significant expansion in the capabilities of the Iranian military, including the Republican Guard and the Quds Force. It comes just as Iran is straining to keep Bashar Assad in power, dominate the portions of Iraq not controlled by Islamic State and help the Houthis fight Saudi Arabia in Yemen. That makes it a very good deal for Iran.

Mr. Kagan is the director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.


www.wsj.com
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BeitragVerfasst am: Mo Jul 20, 2015 19:37:28 
Titel: kleiner Österreichbezug….
Antworten mit Zitat

nun ist es ja so, dass der junge Aussenminister Kurz durchaus Potential hätte, und einen weit angenehmeren Eindruck hinterlässt als das Gros des Restes dieser Regierung…

er hat immerhin letztes Mal in Teheran ganz offiziell die Oppositionsszene im Iran besucht….sowas würde einem Heinz Fischer nie einfallen..

gut..

jetzt ist der Kurz ein bissel enthusiasmiert wegen der unseligen Nukedealkonferenz mit der Mullahgang in Wien…

nicht so OK…

aber er meint, offenbar im Ernst, dass es eine gute Idee wär die Qudsterrorgang der Mullahs im Kampf gegen die IS einzusetzen…

ist natürlich Schwachsinn …furchtbar…das wär wie den Teufel mit dem Beelzebub austreiben zu versuchen….

aber gut, was ein österreichischer Aussenminister zu dem Thema sagt ist eigentlich eh Powidl, weil Österreich ja z.B. den Nukedeal mit den Mullahs gar nicht militärisch unterschreiben kann…unsere EFs könnten mangels Ausrüstung ja nicht einmal bei einer No-Fly Zone mitmachen...

wenn was schief geht, und es wird massivst schiefgehen, können die USA, und in Europa das UK und Frankreich die Sache militärisch in Ordnung bringen…und werden das auch tun….

was Österreich dazu sagt ist völlig wurscht…

das Problem in unserer Welt ist leider, dass Herr Pres. Obama offenbar die Meinung teilt…

das ist die eigentliche Katastrophe…

was den Kurz betrifft…der hat sich natürlich jetzt für alle Zeit blamiert, und öffentlich klar gemacht, dass sein aussen- und sicherheitspolitischer IQ unter der Raumtemperatur angesiedelt ist…damit ist er für den Job ungeeignet...

http://derstandard.at/2000019409142/Kurz-will-Iran-als-Partner-gegen-IS-gewinnen

ein kleiner "Primer" für unser Aussenministerbubi, damit er weiss, mit wem er es da zu tun hat….

http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/qods.htm

die ganze Sache bringt natürlich einen ganz grossen Schildbürgerstreich des Abkommens ins Rampenlicht…

Zitat:
….The Iran deal’s Qassem Soleimani problem

Foreign and Defense Policy, Middle East

Buried on page 95 of the draft of the nuclear agreement released by the Russians is the fact that sanctions will be lifted on Qassem Soleimani, head of the Qods Force, the elite unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps charged with export of revolution. In short, Soleimani is responsible for the deaths of more Americans than any living terrorist, and perhaps any dead one as well. Lifting sanctions on Soleimani is like agreeing to do business with Osama Bin Laden on September 12, 2001.

Here’s the question: If this was just about Iran’s nuclear program, as President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have repeatedly insisted, then why have diplomats agreed to lift sanctions on Soleimani? Then again, perhaps this is a subtle reminder that Soleimani had all along a very deep interest in Iran’s nuclear capabilities after all…….


http://www.aei.org/publication/the-iran-deals-qassem-soleimani-problem/
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BeitragVerfasst am: Do Jul 23, 2015 21:13:15 
Titel: der gute Christian Ortner
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bringt es in der "Die Presse" auf den Punkt…

Zitat:
……..Zu befürchten ist, dass ein schwacher Westen sich letztlich zum Helfershelfer der iranischen Atomwaffenpläne hat machen lassen. Darin einen Beitrag zum Frieden zu sehen ist angesichts des mörderischen Charakters des Mullah-Regimes eher originell. Mittlerweile scheint übrigens John Kerry von seinen neuen Freunden schon etwas enttäuscht zu sein. Khameneis jüngste Einlassungen nannte er „besorgniserregend“………..


http://diepresse.com/home/meinung/quergeschrieben/christianortner/4783304/Die-Traenen-des-John-Kerry-und-die-raue-Wirklichkeit
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BeitragVerfasst am: Di Jul 28, 2015 06:25:54 
Titel: war leider zuviel
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erwartet, dass Frankreich doch noch den Wahnsinn, den die US Obamaadministration da mit dem Nukedeal mit dem Mullahregime im Iran angerichtet hat, verhindern würde…

Dieser Kommentar zeigt natürlich auch sehr genau im Rückblick auf in welch "unmögliche" Position die "unilaterale" Verhandlungsführung der Obamaadministration, in dem man von Seiten Pres. Obamas sämtliche Druckmittel gegenüber dem Mullahregime sehr früh schon aus der Hand gegeben hat, ohne Not, die eher kritischen Partner im Konsortium gebracht hat..

Zitat:


France Throws In the Towel on Iran

Once a lonely voice of dissent, France now prepares to cash in on countless lucrative contracts.

By JOHN VINOCUR

July 27, 2015 2:57 p.m. ET

“ Laurent Fabius, the Iron Man Against Iran,” read the headline July 1 on the news magazine Le Point’s account of France’s role in the final international push toward controlling Iran’s atomic-weapons intentions. The subhead continued: “Tougher than the United States, the French foreign minister could once again derail the negotiations on Iranian nukes.”

As things turned out two weeks later, a deal was signed. The tough guys—the French diplomats and defense experts who had once called themselves the “guardians of the temple” of nuclear nonproliferation—had neither kicked butt nor taken names.

Six weeks before the deal, a group of diplomats and experts had told an American expert that they were “extremely unhappy” about the lost cause the deal had become. According to the American’s account, the experts said the core of the permanent agreement France sought to keep a grip on Iran’s nuclear potential had been devastated by an early Obama administration offer to Tehran of a “sunset” arrangement whose strictures would disappear in a little more than a decade.

In the end, France did not choose to lie across the tracks with a gesture of principle. Its admirable voice was still. It ducked and made no waves. The result is a France now confronted by an awkward dilemma.

How do the French get a shot at the big-bucks contracts a sanctions-free Iran will be signing after France’s years of self-portrayal as the last angry and honest man willing to block Iranian nukes? Can they do so without renouncing a principled decade of insisting Iran must be stopped cold?

Just hearing Mr. Fabius exposes this real discomfort. The nuke deal he once sought had to be “robust.” The version the world wound up with instead, he now describes as “sufficiently robust.” Coercive diplomacy has become “constructive firmness.”

When asked by reporters about the impossibly convoluted “snap-back” provisions that supposedly insure the deal’s big-power signatories’ capacity to reimpose sanctions, the foreign minister replied, “I concede it’s subtle.” And what of the several weeks Iran would get to cover up before completion of an investigation on a perceived violation? “Obviously, that’s rather long,” he said.

These careful verbal calibrations were almost artful, until the line broke. It snapped when Mr. Fabius asserted, John Kerry-like, that war is the only alternative to accepting the deal France didn’t derail.

This new line is embarrassing. A French guardian of the temple produced a study in 2009 showing that U.S. military threats worked. The expert argued that Iran invariably backed down in every instance when the U.S. had signaled the possible use of force—without its use. The same year, after Barack Obama’s extended hand replaced America’s clenched fist, Thérèse Delpech, then the strategic director of the French Atomic Energy Commission, said “the notion of a United States military threat has no credibility in Iran.”

In August 2013, the French were ready, alongside America’s bombers, to attack Tehran’s Syrian protectorate. Then President Obama suddenly backed off. President François Hollande described himself as “flabbergasted” by the decision.

In the French view, the raids’ precision and targeting would have scared Iran and Russia, also a supporter of the mullahs and Bashar Assad. Messrs. Hollande and Fabius have both made clear since then that they believe the American fade facilitated Islamic State’s emergence as a permanent factor in the region.

Yet these French backers of firing real rockets at Iranian-related Syrian targets two years ago now ape the Obama administration in saying nonacceptance of the nuclear deal is the tripwire for a full-fledged Middle East war. Disingenuous? In March, French mistrust of the Obama administration’s yes-to-everything negotiating approach toward Tehran was such that Mr. Fabius privately informed parliamentarians “the United States is ready to sign anything with Iran,” according to a French news report.

While Le Point’s Iron Man Against Iran was preparing for the so-called final showdown in Vienna this month, another French newspaper was disclosing the name of a foreign-ministry negotiator described as telling French businessmen in May that an agreement was at hand—and to “hurry up into Iran because your competitors are already there.”

Now Mr. Fabius is heeding that same advice, heading to Tehran on Wednesday. He is 10 days behind Sigmar Gabriel, Germany’s vice chancellor and leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), whose visit was remarkably instructive.

Mr. Gabriel called Iran “a friend.” The reaction in Germany, a nearly passive player during the years of negotiations, ranged from critical to revulsed with distress that German commercial interests appeared as the vice chancellor’s single concern.

Volker Beck, a parliamentary policy spokesman for the Greens, the party which could replace the SPD in a future Angela Merkel-led coalition, said Mr. Gabriel had feigned normalized relations between the two countries. “With its position on Israel and its human rights situation,” Mr. Beck exclaimed, “this Iranian regime cannot be Germany’s friend or strategic partner.”

President Hollande and Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani have meanwhile exchanged what the Elysée Palace described as telephoned “congratulations” on the nuclear deal. In Tehran, Mr. Fabius is a certain bet not to echo the German legislator’s judgment—or to represent France’s vanished frankness.

Mr. Vinocur is former executive editor of the International Herald Tribune.


www.wsj.com
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BeitragVerfasst am: Mi Jul 29, 2015 20:36:52 
Titel: tja…..
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warten wir mal, ob es bei unseren "Qualitätsmedien" in Österreich zumindest ein paar kritische Stimmen geben wird, wenn Fischer, Kurz und Leitl bald zur grossen Schleimerei zu dem Terrorpack von Regime in Teheran aufbrechen werden…

http://www.ortneronline.at/?p=36234

http://lizaswelt.net/2015/07/21/gute-freunde-kann-niemand-trennen/

http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article144285464/Wofuer-will-Gabriel-den-Iran-eigentlich-belohnen.html
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BeitragVerfasst am: Do Jul 30, 2015 11:35:21 
Titel: eine hervorragende "tour d'horizon"
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über die Issues…

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g5QeGKIMgUY
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BeitragVerfasst am: Sa Aug 01, 2015 12:09:39 
Titel: Reuel Marc Gerecht
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im "Tschörnl" zu den vielfach geäusserten Hoffnungen, gerade in europäischen Staatskanzleien, das Nukeabkommen würde sich positiv, also moderierend, auf diverse Aktivitäten des Mullahregimes auswirken..

historisch wären diese Hoffnungen nicht berechtigt, und würden entäuscht werden, meint er..

und der Gerecht kennt sich wirklich sehr gut aus im Iran…



Zitat:


History Contradicts the Dream of Iranian Moderation

Repression lifted slightly in the 1990s but the economy did not, and state-sponsored terrorism abroad continued.

By REUEL MARC GERECHT

July 31, 2015 6:50 p.m. ET

Most backers of the nuclear accord with Iran hopefully insist that the theocratic regime will moderate once sanctions are lifted. Plugged back into the global economy, Iran will become less militant. The “pragmatists”—those surrounding President Hasan Rouhani, who supposedly want better relations with the West, will grow in strength; the “hard-liners”—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the ideologically ardent clergy—will weaken.

This is an unlikely scenario. Consider what happened after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, died in 1989. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the mentor of Mr. Rouhani, was elected president shortly afterward and remained in office until 1997. Mr. Rafsanjani, with Mr. Rouhani always at his side, encouraged and welcomed European engagement. A regime of global sanctions did not exist, and American sanctions were far less effective then. Tens of billions of dollars in foreign investment and trade arrived.

The acceptable range of cultural expression in the Islamic Republic broadened, as the entire nation, exhausted by a horrific war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, reckoned with the losses. Iran’s internal intelligence apparatus lightened up a degree and became more selective in brutalizing and murdering dissidents. Tehran began accepting educational exchanges with European universities and institutes. Messrs. Rafsanjani and Rouhani, antagonists of the obstreperous Revolutionary Guards, attempted to curtail the military and economic influence of the supreme leader’s praetorians.

Yet President Rafsanjani’s pragmatism produced little economic dynamism. Free enterprise in clerical Iran is an Islamic variation of the state capitalism now practiced in Putin’s Russia: corrupt, nepotistic, constrained and co-opted by internal-security forces, and usually guided as much by politics as profit. The Islamic Republic’s economy is a competition between revolution-loyal mafias feeding off the oil wealth of the state.

As a result, when capital flowed into the country the ruling elite got a lot richer, but average Iranians did not. The astonishing efflorescence of Iran’s young filmmakers in the 1990s is directly tied to this sense of acute economic disappointment, which produced movies with searing allegories that won numerous international awards.

Most important, through it all, terrorism and support for Hezbollah remained a staple of the regime’s statecraft. The bombings in Argentina of the Israeli Embassy in 1992 and a Jewish community center in 1994 happened on Mr. Rafsanjani’s watch. So did the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, an attack that killed 19 American servicemen. During this period, the assassination of Iranian expatriates—a specialty of the intelligence ministry, an institution that Messrs. Rafsanjani and Rouhani founded and nurtured—became common.

How will so-called moderation this time around, led by President Rouhani, be any different? If anything, life in Iran after the nuclear accord is likely to become more harsh and politically convulsive.

The Revolutionary Guards are now much more powerful, both economically and politically, than they were in the 1990s. Lifting sanctions will release more than $100 billion in oil revenues, a windfall certain to unleash the appetites of the clerics and the technocrats in orbit around President Rouhani. We will see a feeding frenzy. The White House’s prediction that most of this money will remain in Iran might be solid; it is unlikely, however, to go to the people.

It is possible that Mr. Rouhani will be able to paper over the political and personal animosities among the ruling elite with so much cash. He probably also will try to bridge the differences, using Mr. Rafsanjani’s playbook, by finding common ground overseas. Supporting radical Shiite groups such as Hezbollah—or even radical Sunnis whose shared hatred for the U.S. allows them to overlook their anti-Shiite sentiments—has always been popular with the Islamic Republic’s VIPs.

Further, Iran’s police state is likely to get more aggressive, not less, because of the nuclear agreement. Since the 1990s, Iran’s leaders have learned how dissent can get out of control. As the Washington Post’s imprisoned reporter Jason Rezaian can testify, freedom of speech has contracted since Mr. Rouhani became president.

Failed expectations are always dangerous, and Mr. Rouhani has seriously oversold what the nuclear deal will do economically for the average Iranian. If a bonanza doesn’t arrive, Mr. Rouhani may have trouble in the 2017 presidential election. More dangerous, the lower and middle classes in the cities could begin to find common ground with the college educated. The clerical regime survived the massive pro-democracy street demonstrations in 2009 in part because those protests didn’t draw in the urban working-class, the bedrock of the clergy’s power.

Mr. Rouhani’s political model—an Islamic variation of China’s—is to buy off political dissidence with rising GNP. But the Islamic Republic’s bureaucracies have none of China’s Confucian proficiency and all of its corruption. Internal political uncertainty and the lingering fear of U.S. sanctions will limit foreign enthusiasm for serious investment, even in the energy sector. So will Iran’s constitutionally mandated “buyback” provisions that prevent foreign ownership in oil and natural-gas fields. Iran will need to generate more money than it has since 1979 to have any chance of significantly improving the lot of unconnected Iranians, who now regularly postpone marriage and children in pursuit of fewer, less-remunerative jobs.

The Iranian president certainly believes he’s negotiated a deal in which he can have it all: a mountain of cash, foreign investment and arms, and recognition as a nuclear-threshold state. But the cash infusion will only stress the fault lines of Iranian society if it doesn’t foster nationwide prosperity, making Mr. Rouhani’s lasting legacy one of political volatility. Iran has, lest we forget, tens of millions of people who have grown tired of rich mullahs and Revolutionary Guards who preach an austere, angry, revolutionary faith that is no longer the one most people share.

Mr. Gerecht, a former Iranian targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.


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BeitragVerfasst am: Mo Aug 03, 2015 11:09:05 
Titel: wie bei allen Veträgen
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ist oft das "Kleingedruckte" wichtig…

klar, dass hier im US Kongress jetzt hart debattiert werden wird..

neben der in den USA nicht unwichtigen Frage, ob nicht doch der US Senat verfassungsmässig über einen so wichtigen Vertrag abstimmen müsste ( in etwa vergleichbar mit der Situation in Europa, wo ja auch viele nationale Parlamente der Griechenlandhilfe z.B. zustimmen müssen), was die derzeitige US Administration verhindern möchte, weil das wär das Ende des "Deals" bei der derzeitigen Zusammensetzung des US Senats ( 2/3 Mehrheit im US Senat für ein solches "Treaty" würde es nicht spielen) , scheint es noch "Kleingedrucktes" zu geben, welches nicht öffentlich sein soll…und zwar zwischen IRAN und der IAEA..

Im Falle des Iranabkommens scheint überhaupt das "Kleingedruckte" "geheim" zu sein..die IAEA ist aber eine UN Organisation, also welche Gründe für eine Geheimhaltung von Vertragsbestandteilen sollte es da geben..? Geht ja alle UN Mitglieder an, was da drinnen steht..da wird ja nicht über Quoten für Bananen verhandelt..sondern über eher Schwerwiegendes, was die Sicherheit der Welt betrifft...

muss einen trifftigen Grund haben warum der Iran hier auf "Geheimhaltung" pocht…

http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/4791389/Iran-warnt-IAEA-vor-Enthullung-von-Geheimabkommen?from=gl.home_politik

Das "Tschörnl" kommentiert diesen Sachverhalt im US Kontext so:

Zitat:


Iran’s Closed Covenants

Congress should insist on public disclosure of secret nuclear side deals.


July 31, 2015 7:51 p.m. ET

The Obama Administration insists there’s nothing secret about the Iran nuclear deal, even as it claims not to have read two crucial side deals Tehran has struck with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). “Confidential agreements, but no secrets” is the way top U.S. negotiator Wendy Sherman describes the deals, which are thought to concern the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programs.

Try parsing that distinction. And while you’re at it, consider that there might be additional separate agreements we haven’t heard about. We raise the possibility after speaking with Rep. Mike Pompeo, the Kansas Republican who sits on the House Intelligence Committee, and who more-or-less stumbled on the two side deals when the deputy director of the IAEA disclosed their existence to him and Sen. Tom Cotton (R., Ark.) in a meeting in Vienna.

“When you ask [the Administration] if there are other [side deals], you don’t get a yes or no answer,” Mr. Pompeo tells us. The Congressman adds that he and his colleagues have been frustrated by the Administration’s failure to answer their questions even in classified sessions. What does Mr. Pompeo know about the two side deals the Administration does acknowledge? “Nearly nothing,” he says, “and we’ve been briefed four times.”

The Administration claims this is no big deal because Iran and the IAEA are entitled to reach a non-disclosed understanding to resolve their differences. “This is pretty standard,” says Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz.
Now there’s an epic dodge. If the U.S. isn’t privy to Iran’s dealings with the IAEA, it’s because Secretary of State John Kerry and other negotiators conceded the point to Iran at the 11th hour. He might have done so figuring that punting to the IAEA gave him the chance to seal the deal without having to know exactly what’s in it. To adapt Nancy Pelosi’s phrase, if you pass the deal you still won’t know what’s in it. So much for President Obama’s assurances that the deal isn’t based on trust but on “unprecedented verification.”

All of this is vital because Iran hasn’t answered the IAEA’s questions regarding the so-called Possible Military Dimensions of its nuclear program. The IAEA has also been seeking access to Iran’s military site at Parchin, which inspectors haven’t visited for a decade and where Iran is suspected of carrying out experiments and tests on weaponizing a nuclear device.

But unless the world can have a clear understanding of what Iran is already capable of doing, there’s no way to know how long it would take the regime to build a bomb if it decides to do so. This also undermines Mr. Obama’s central claim that the deal puts Iran at least one year away from a bomb if it walks away from the agreement.

There’s also the question of the reliability of the IAEA. Though the agency has been admirably non-political under current Director General Yukiya Amano, that was not the case during the 12-year tenure of predecessor Mohamed ElBaradei, who regularly sounded off on political questions and often acted like Tehran’s lawyer.

Mr. Pompeo adds that the agency has no mechanism for enforcing the agreements it signs with Iran: “Is there an independent penalty for violations of the side deals?” Iran’s deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has already said it won’t allow U.S. or Canadian inspectors to be part of any verification team, and that the IAEA will not be allowed to see “sensitive and military documents,” according to an Associated Press report. Other than that, we guess, the access is unprecedented.

Beyond these details is a larger question about the conduct of American foreign policy. U.S. diplomats are often involved in secret diplomacy, but we can think of no instance in U.S. history where the results of so consequential an agreement were closed to public inspection. No U.S. secrets are at stake, yet the Administration insists on briefing Congress on the Iran-IAEA deal only in closed session.

It’s nearly a century since Woodrow Wilson insisted, as the first of his Fourteen Points, on “open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in public view.” That standard has served Americans well as they debated the merits of complex and controversial treaties, whether over the Panama Canal, relations with Taiwan, or arms control with the Soviet Union.

That’s the standard President Obama appears to have abandoned. He has already evaded the constitutional obligation to submit consequential foreign commitments as treaties requiring ratification by two-thirds of the Senate. He will deem his Iran deal to be U.S. policy if merely one-third of either house of Congress doesn’t object. There’s no excuse to compound that evasion with side deals that Americans aren’t allowed to see.


www.wsj.com
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BeitragVerfasst am: Do Aug 20, 2015 14:51:10 
Titel: Aha…...
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wenn das stimmen sollte, was da geschrieben steht…dann würd ich meinen ist die ganze Chose um den "Deal" ein Non-Starter….nicht nur im US Kongress und im US Senat….

sondern eventuell auch für nicht ganz unwichtige Unterzeichnerstaaten wie Frankreich z.B…

scheint, als kommen die "geheimen" Monkey Deals zwischen IAEA und den Mullahs langsam ans Licht…

unglaublich…..

Zitat:
…..VIENNA (AP) — Iran will be allowed to use its own inspectors to investigate a site it has been accused of using to develop nuclear arms, operating under a secret agreement with the U.N. agency that normally carries out such work, according to a document seen by The Associated Press……..


http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a9f4e40803924a8ab4c61cb65b2b2bb3/ap-exclusive-un-let-iran-inspect-alleged-nuke-work-site

http://uk.businessinsider.com/iran-secret-side-deal-text-2015-8?r=US&IR=T
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